

**Workshop on the International Treaty for  
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture**  
IRRI Headquarters, Philippines, 18-20 February 2002

The workshop was co-sponsored by the CGIAR System-wide Genetic Resources Programme (SGRP), the Genetic Resources Policy Committee (GRPC), the Central Advisory Service on Intellectual Property (CAS) and the System Office. It was hosted by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) and held 18 to 20 February, preceding a regular meeting of the GRPC.

Participants at the workshop included Directors General, senior managers, members of Boards of Trustees and genetic resources and intellectual property scientists from 12 Centres, as well as members of the GRPC, System Office, SGRP, CAS, TAC and FAO (attachment 1). The workshop examined the new Treaty, adopted by the FAO Conference in November 2001, and its implications for the work of the Centres and partners. Specifically, the workshop addressed the Treaty's call for agreements with Centres concerning the in-trust collections of plant genetic resources, and the request of the FAO Commission for a new Material Transfer Agreement to be used until the Treaty comes into force.

The workshop agenda and the paper "A Guide to the International Treaty" which provided participants with background on the Treaty and the requirements for its implementation are attached (attachments 2 and 3, respectively). The workshop drafted a standard text for the agreement between Centres and the Governing Body of the Treaty for negotiation on the coming into force of the Treaty, and identified issues that would need to be covered in an accompanying statement on the practical implementation of such an agreement. It also produced a draft new interim MTA as requested by the FAO Commission, for submission to its 9<sup>th</sup> Session in October 2002. Currently, this draft MTA is with FAO for approval; subsequently it will be re-circulated to Centres for Board endorsement.

The text of the Treaty and associated FAO Conference and Commission Resolutions are available at the web site of the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: <http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa>

Attachment 1

**SGRP/GRPC/CAS/CG System Office Workshop on the International Treaty on  
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture**  
IRRI Headquarters, Philippines, 18-20 February 2002

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**WORKSHOP ON THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON  
PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE**

IRRI Headquarters, Philippines, 18-20 February 2002

**Agenda**

**MONDAY, 18 February**

08:00 REGISTRATION

**08.30-09.00 WELCOME**

- Host: International Rice Research Institute - Dr Ronald Cantrell, Director General
- Organizers:
  - CGIAR System-wide Genetic Resources Programme & Genetic Resources Policy Committee - Dr Geoffrey Hawtin, Director General, IPGRI
  - Central Advisory Service on Intellectual Property – Dr Victoria Henson-Apollonio
  - System Office - Dr Francisco Reifschneider, Director CGIAR
- Introduction of participants
- Agenda and Workshop organization

**09.00-12.00 SESSION 1. BACKGROUND** (*Coffee at 10.15-10.45*)

**Chair: Ronald Cantrell      Presenter: Geoffrey Hawtin**

- Origin of the CGIAR collections
- Political and legal status of the collections pre-1994
- The 1994 “in-trust” Agreements with FAO
  - Context and content (including the interim character of the Agreements)
  - Sharing of Center experiences under the regime of the International Undertaking
- The Convention on Biological Diversity
  - The approach of the CBD
  - Resolution 3 of the Nairobi Final Act
  - Sharing of Center experiences with national legislation (CBD-implementing legislation)
- Re-negotiation of the International Undertaking
  - How the negotiations were organized: the “culture” of negotiations
  - CGIAR role and input
- Sharing of CGIAR System and Center policies related to genetic resources and intellectual property

**12.00-12.30 SESSION 2. THE TREATY AND ITS ASSOCIATED ELEMENTS**

**Chair: Ronald Cantrell      Presenter: Cary Fowler**

- Introduction – expectations and timeline

- Overview of the elements
  - Treaty
  - Related Resolutions from FAO Conference and Commission
  - New Center-FAO Agreements, including an interpretive statement
  - New Material Transfer Agreements
- The counterfactual: what could happen without a Treaty or if Centers choose not to adhere to the Treaty?

**12.30-14.00 LUNCH**

**14.00-17.30 SESSION 3. CONTENT OF THE NEW TREATY** (*Coffee 15.15-15.45*)

*Chair: Francisco Reifschneider      Presenter: Cary Fowler*

- Overview: structure, aims and general approach of the Treaty
- Detailed article-by-article analysis
  - Discussion, questions/answers

**19:00 RECEPTION, IRRI Guesthouse**

**TUESDAY, 19 February**

**08.30-12.30 SESSION 4. OUTSTANDING ISSUES** (*Coffee 10.15-10.45*)

*Chair: Carl Gustaf-Thornstrom      Discussion Panel: Cary Fowler, Gerald Moore, Jose Esquinas-Alcazar, Robert Bertram*

- Ambiguities in the definitions of terms used in the Treaty
- The List of Crops for the Multilateral System
- Disposition of collections of non-Annex I crops
- Access for direct utilization for production
- Restoration of PGRFA
- Practical matters pertaining to implementation

**12.30-14.00 LUNCH**

**14.00-15.15 SESSION 5. IMPLICATIONS FOR IP MANAGEMENT OF CENTER RESEARCH PRODUCTS**

*Chair: Timothy Reeves      Presenter: Victoria Henson-Apollonio*

- The IP scene today (from the perspective of plant material, PGRFA)
- IP options for the Centers
- Guidelines for implementation of Center IP management (consistent with the proposed terms of the Agreements and MTAs)

**15.15-15.45 COFFEE**

**15.45-17.30 SESSION 6. NEXT STEPS**

*Chair: Robert Bertram      Presenter: Cary Fowler*

- Presentation of draft texts for MTA, Agreement and Interpretive Statement (10 mins)  
**Breakout Groups to discuss draft MTA, Agreement and Statement**

**WEDNESDAY, 20 February**

**08.00-09.45 TOUR of IRRI Genetic Resources Center**

**09.45-10.15 COFFEE**

**10.15-12.30 SESSION 6. NEXT STEPS continued**

*Chair: Robert Bertram*

- Discussion/approval of elements to go into a draft Agreement
- Discussion of interpretive statement to accompany draft Agreement
- Discussion/approval of a new draft – interim – MTA

**12.30-14.00 LUNCH**

**14.00-15.15 SESSION 7. PROCESS AT THE CENTER LEVEL**

*Chair: Manuel Lantin*

*Presenter: Geoffrey Hawtin*

- Informing Boards of Trustees (BOT approval of Agreements)
- Informing staff and implementing policies
  - CGIAR System policy guidelines – amendments
  - Center policy guidelines

**15.15-15.45 COFFEE**

**15.45-17.00 SESSION 8. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW TREATY FOR PARTNERS AND COLLABORATORS**

*Chair: Manuel Lantin*

*Presenter: Geoffrey Hawtin*

- Current and planned initiatives concerning the Treaty, partners and collaborators
- Explaining the new Treaty to partners and collaborators
- Developing a policy environment conducive to research and germplasm exchange under the Treaty

*To be published by the CGIAR System-wide Genetic Resources Programme (SGRP) and the International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI) as IPGRI Issues in Genetic Resources No. 10*

April 2002

**A Guide to the International Treaty  
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture  
-- prepared to assist CGIAR centers  
in understanding and preparing for implementation of the Treaty --**

by Cary Fowler,<sup>1</sup> Gerald Moore,<sup>2</sup> and Geoffrey Hawtin<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Director General, IPGRI; and Programme Leader, System-wide Genetic Resources Programme (SGRP).

## **Introduction**

In November 2001, the FAO Conference adopted the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture<sup>4</sup>, by consensus. After more than 15 sessions of the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture and its subsidiary bodies, delegates completed the task of renegotiating the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (adopted in 1983) to bring it into harmony with the Convention on Biological Diversity.

The stated objectives of the Treaty are the “conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their use...”

The Treaty contains 35 articles and 2 annexes. While the scope of the Treaty is comprehensive, covering all plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, readers will be particularly interested in the articles that establish a multilateral system of access and benefit-sharing for particular crops, and the article that deals specifically with CGIAR centers and other international agricultural research institutions.

Though it has been adopted, the Treaty will not actually come into force until 90 days after the 40<sup>th</sup> instrument of ratification has been deposited with FAO. In most cases, ratification requires action by a country’s parliament and/or executive. One might expect that for many countries this ratification process could take several years.

In 1994, CGIAR centers concluded agreements with FAO, placing collections of germplasm “in trust” for the benefit of the international community, under the auspices of FAO. It was understood that these agreements were interim, pending completion of the inter-governmental negotiations on the Treaty.

The Treaty will become binding for CGIAR centers, when they (individually) sign agreements with the Governing Body of the Treaty<sup>5</sup> – assuming centers choose to do so. As there will be no “Governing Body” until the treaty itself is ratified by a minimum of 40 countries, the agreements with the Governing Body must await the Treaty’s entry into force, and, until then, the current agreements with FAO, in the context of the International Undertaking, apply. In the interim period, CGIAR centers will want to prepare for the coming into force of the Treaty. In particular, it has been suggested (in a Resolution passed by the 160-country, FAO Commission on Genetic Resources) that centers employ a new interim MTA to be agreed with FAO reflecting the provisions of the Treaty, in advance of the Governing Body approving a new standard MTA to be used by Contracting Parties and centers. (Contracting Parties are countries that have ratified the Treaty.)

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<sup>4</sup> The text of the Treaty and associated resolutions are available at the web site of the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: <http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa>

<sup>5</sup> Or alternatively, 90 days after the center signs for example, if this provision is included (as we would recommend) in the center’s agreement with the Governing Body.

The new Treaty contains an article (Article 15) specifically devoted to the CGIAR centers (and other international institutions) and the collections they hold, and it invites the centers to conclude agreements with the Governing Body in accordance with provisions laid out in the article.

What are the major changes the Treaty will bring for CGIAR centers?

- Adoption of the Treaty should help reduce international tensions around the transfer and use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA), and thus should facilitate collecting and exchange.
- There will be a new MTA, in fact three new MTAs are theoretically possible – (i) a revision of the current MTA for use in the interim period until the Treaty comes into force, (ii) a standard MTA to be adopted by the Treaty’s Governing Body and used by countries and centers thereafter for materials in the multilateral system, and (iii) an MTA to be accepted by the Governing Body not later than its second session, covering materials held by centers of crops not in the multilateral system and collected before the entry into force of the Treaty. The biggest change in these MTAs over the one currently used by centers will be that they will reflect the benefit-sharing provisions of the Treaty. These provisions will rarely directly affect centers themselves given their current ways of operating. The provisions require that a “royalty” be paid into an international fund by the person or entity that accesses material from the multilateral system and uses it to create, for example, a variety that they both commercialize and protect by a form of intellectual property rights (e.g., by patents) that restricts further research and breeding of that product.
- Center access to PGRFA of crops that are included within the Treaty’s multilateral system should become routine and easy – “facilitated” in the language of the Treaty. Access to materials of other crops (including soyabean, groundnut and most tropical forages) will likely be more difficult, requiring (as it does now) a specific agreement with the country providing the access. The concept of “designated” germplasm will effectively be dropped, replaced by the new distinction between PGRFA of crops that are part of the multilateral system and those that are not. It will probably be necessary, nonetheless, to identify the materials covered, and particularly those of non-multilateral system crops. Facilitated access will be provided to materials of crops that are in the multilateral system, with the exception that there will be no obligation to provide materials “under development” during their period of development (see below).
- A number of the provisions of the current agreements with FAO are carried over into the Treaty, for example: respect for phytosanitary regulations, provisions for the return of germplasm in disaster situations, some minimal reporting requirements, etc.
- Procedurally, centers will need to sign new agreements – this time, with the Governing Body of the Treaty – indicating that they will be bound by the provisions of the Treaty. We would

also expect a “statement” to be released concurrently that addresses various technical details concerning implementation of the agreement. And, as mentioned above, there will be new MTAs.

To assist, in particular, the Centers and their Boards of Trustees in their consideration of the Treaty, IPGRI has produced this guide to the new Treaty, focusing on the obligations that centers will assume if/when they formally associate themselves with the Treaty through signing an agreement with its Governing Body. This assessment focuses on the articles in the Treaty that deal specifically with the centers, and with the topics of access and benefit-sharing under the Multilateral System being created by the Treaty.

Following a detailed examination of selected Treaty text, we examine outstanding issues and problems, and present a timetable outlining the steps that countries and centers will need to take to prepare to ratify and implement the Treaty.

Our assessment begins with Article 15, which pertains directly to the CGIAR.

## **CGIAR Centers and the Treaty**

### **Overview**

Article 15 invites CGIAR centers to sign agreements with the Governing Body to bring their *ex situ* collections under the terms of the Treaty. Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA) in the Multilateral System (i.e., materials of crops listed in Annex I.) will be distributed under the terms of a standard Material Transfer Agreement (MTA), common to Contracting Parties and centers, to be developed by the Governing Body. Other PGRFA assembled prior to the coming into force of the Treaty would also be distributed under a standard MTA based on the current MTA as amended / approved by the Governing Body. Non-Multilateral System material received and conserved after the coming into force of the Treaty would be available on mutually agreed terms agreed with the country of origin or other country that acquired them in accordance with the CBD or other applicable law. Other provisions of the Treaty related to the centers are similar to those now in effect under the FAO-CGIAR Agreements. No provisions are specified for differential treatment of Contracting Parties and non-Parties in relation to materials made available by centers under the Treaty.

While CGIAR Centers currently maintain approximately 10% of the accessions held in *ex situ* conditions worldwide, they conserve a much higher percentage of known diversity, due in large part to the composition of the collections. On average, only 16% of national collections is comprised of landraces and wild relatives. The comparable figure for the CGIAR is 73%.<sup>6</sup> In addition, CGIAR collections are well maintained and generally well documented. The combination of these factors makes these collections a unique resource and one of great utility to breeders. Not surprisingly, the collections are used extensively and research on flows of accessions into and out of CGIAR genebanks demonstrates that virtually every country in the world is a major net beneficiary of germplasm flows.<sup>7</sup> CGIAR collections, therefore, are important not just for CGIAR plant breeders. They are the cornerstone of any international system of germplasm conservation and management. Their status was discussed extensively in the negotiations leading to the International Treaty, and as noted above, the Treaty contains an article devoted to these collections.

An analysis of the implications to centers of the CGIAR of the new International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources logically begins with Article 15 of the Treaty. This article deals specifically with the CGIAR and is entitled, “*Ex Situ* Collections of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture held by the International Research Centres of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research and other International Institutions.” In what follows, we

<sup>6</sup> FAO (1998) The State of the World’s Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. Rome: FAO.

<sup>7</sup> Fowler, C., M. Smale and S. Gaiji (2001) “Unequal Exchange? Recent Transfers of Agricultural Resources and their Implications for Developing Countries,” *Development Policy Review*. Vol. 19, No. 2.

examine this article paragraph-by-paragraph, making reference to other parts of the Treaty as necessary.

**15.1. The Contracting Parties recognize the importance to this Treaty of the *ex situ* collections of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture held in trust by the International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs) of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). The Contracting Parties call upon the IARCs to sign agreements with the Governing Body with regard to such *ex situ* collections, in accordance with the following terms and conditions:**

The opening paragraph of the article is an important one, as it defines the scope or “reach” of the Treaty vis-à-vis the centers. It echoes the language of the previous agreement with FAO in its reference to *ex situ* collections being held in trust by the centers. And, it invites centers to sign agreements with the Governing Body of the Treaty regarding such *ex situ* collections.<sup>8</sup> (The Governing Body is constituted by the “Contracting Parties” to the Treaty, i.e., the countries that have formally ratified the Treaty.) In effect, the Treaty’s provisions extend to (1.) all materials held “in trust” by the centers as of the date on which the centers’ formally accede to the Treaty, i.e. the date from which the agreements with the Governing Body come into effect, whether these materials are of crops listed in Annex I (crops included in the multilateral system) or not, and (2.) PGRFA of Annex I crops acquired after the coming into force of the Treaty.

Strictly speaking, the Treaty’s provisions on access and benefit-sharing will not apply to materials of non-Annex I crops (e.g., groundnut, soyabean, and most tropical forages) acquired after the coming into force of the Treaty. Such materials would, by practice and as is called for in Article 15, be acquired on the basis of the provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity, i.e., by “prior informed consent,” and on the basis of “mutually agreed terms. This, of course, would not preclude a center from acquiring such materials on terms that would be fully consistent with the Treaty and that would, hopefully, allow them to be distributed under the same standard MTA. Article 15 differentiates between Annex I and non-Annex I PGRFA in terms of how centers will manage these materials.

**15.1(a) Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture listed in Annex I of this Treaty and held by the IARCs shall be made available in accordance with the provisions set out in Part IV of this Treaty.**

As the text of 15.1(a) clearly states, centers will handle Annex I materials in the same way that Contracting Parties to the Treaty do. The details of how such PGRFA, the bulk of *ex situ* collections held by CGIAR centers, are to be managed under the terms of the new Treaty, will be presented in a later section of this document. It is important to realize that Article 15.1(a) covers

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<sup>8</sup> The Treaty makes specific reference to materials held “in trust,” i.e., to those formally designated under agreements with FAO. Some centers consider that all materials (including materials not formally designated under the FAO agreements) are “in trust” in that they are in the public domain – this is a separate issue. It is important to realize that the Treaty pertains to plant *genetic resources*. It defines this term in a way which respects Parties’ – and centers’ – property rights over material they have developed or which is under development. Thus, it is expected that materials currently designated under the agreements with FAO would fall under the provisions of Article 15 and would be treated according to the relevant provisions of the Treaty’s articles on access and benefit-sharing. In addition, centers could, at their discretion, choose to treat additional materials (e.g., breeding lines, varieties) in a similar way, in effect foregoing certain property claims over these products of center research.

the huge majority of accessions held by centers. This short paragraph states, in effect, that the rules for handling most center-held germplasm will be exactly the same rules as those the countries have decided to apply to themselves and their germplasm. This also means that uncertainties about how certain provisions of the Treaty will be interpreted or implemented are uncertainties not just for the CGIAR but for countries. As the saying goes, “we are in the same boat.”

**15.1(b) Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture other than those listed in Annex I of this Treaty and collected before its entry into force that are held by IARCs shall be made available in accordance with the provisions of the MTA currently in use pursuant to agreements between the IARCs and the FAO. This MTA shall be amended by the Governing Body no later than its second regular session, in consultation with the IARCs, in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty, especially Articles 12 and 13, and under the following conditions:**

Paragraph 15.1 (b) begins to lay out the terms under which centers will manage non-Annex I materials collected prior to the coming into force of the Treaty.

The intention of the Treaty is for centers to manage non-Annex I materials held “in trust” by the centers in roughly the same way as Annex I materials. There are a few differences, however, as well as some possible ambiguities with the text quoted above. The text calls for non-Annex I PGRFA collected prior to the entry into force of the Treaty to be made available in accordance with the terms of the current MTA until that MTA is amended to reflect the provisions of the Treaty dealing with access, benefit-sharing, etc. The problem with this formulation is that some materials collected/assembled by centers prior to the coming into force of the Treaty will have been acquired with conditions attached that would preclude their being treated this way. Since the coming into force of the Convention on Biological Diversity (and even before this), centers have collected materials on the basis of terms mutually agreed with the country. For non-Annex I materials that were (or will be “designated” prior to the coming into force of the new Treaty), there should be no problems in managing them consistent with the provisions of the Treaty. This will not be possible, however, in those few cases in which materials were collected “with strings attached.” Treaty negotiators clearly did not intend the language of paragraph 15.1 (b) to negate agreements that centers might have made with countries when collections were made. This “problem” can and should be resolved in the agreements that centers conclude with the Governing Body of the Treaty. These agreements will need to clarify that centers will manage non-Annex I PGRFA according to Article 15 except in cases where the terms under which the materials were acquired will not allow for this.

This situation may also arise in some cases with Annex I materials. Contracting Parties will have bound themselves to providing facilitated access to PGRFA of materials in the multilateral system (Annex I PGRFA). However, non-Contracting Parties will not have committed themselves to this, and centers would have no reason or right to abrogate agreements with such countries that included conditions related to how the center might use or distribute these PGRFA. Again, this issue might be clarified in a statement we release regarding implementation.

Paragraph 15.1. (b) indicates that centers will continue to use the existing standard Material Transfer Agreement until a new MTA (reflecting the relevant provisions of the Treaty) is agreed upon by the Governing Body. This should not be read as inconsistent, however, with the FAO Commission resolution calling for an interim, i.e., a new MTA to be drafted and agreed for use prior to the Governing Body's adoption of a standard MTA. The text of the paragraph charges the Governing Body with finalizing this new MTA no later than its second meeting.

In June 2001, the Sixth Extraordinary Session of the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture also raised and addressed the subject of this "interim" MTA. At that time, the Commission, while negotiating the text of the new Treaty, passed a resolution<sup>9</sup> pertaining to how materials presently held in trust by CGIAR centers would be managed during the period between adoption of the Treaty and its coming into force – a period that could take many months if not some (many?) years. During this period, accessions will still be held in trust under existing FAO-CGIAR agreements. The current agreements with FAO, however, do not preclude FAO and the centers putting into place a new MTA more reflective of the terms of the Treaty than the existing MTA, and this is what the Commission's June 2001 resolution calls for when it requests the preparation of such a revised MTA to be presented to the next regular session of the Commission on Genetic Resources for its consideration.<sup>10</sup> This meeting is scheduled to take place in October 2002 at FAO, Rome.

**15.1.(b)(i) The IARCs shall periodically inform the Governing Body about the MTAs entered into, according to a schedule to be established by the Governing Body;**

Article 15.1.(b)(i) deals with non-Annex I materials that centers will be holding in trust when the Treaty enters into force. The paragraph simply states that Centers will periodically give the Governing Body a listing of recipients of the materials that have been provided under the terms of the agreed MTA. Such records are routinely kept by centers at this time, thus this provision should not be onerous in any way.

**15.1.(b)(ii) The Contracting Parties in whose territory the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture were collected from *in situ* conditions shall be provided with samples of such plant genetic resources for food and agriculture on demand, without any MTA;**

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<sup>9</sup> The text of this resolution is available at the web site of the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: <http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa>

<sup>10</sup> Obtaining agreement of the Commission on such an interim MTA may be difficult however, as it would almost certainly open questions that are meant for the Governing Body to determine, such as the "level, form and manner of payment." Were the interim MTA to impose the Treaty's requirements regarding benefit-sharing, without specifying what they were, users would be discouraged from accessing materials from centers. This would surely not be an acceptable course. Thus, it is possible that no interim MTA will be agreed, and that the current MTA will be used until the Governing Body meets and approves a standard MTA for use by Contracting Parties and CGIAR centers.

Article 15.1.(b) (ii) allows for the provision of genetic resources to Parties that supplied the materials to the center, without resort to an MTA. An article similar to this is found in the current agreements with FAO, except that the current agreements speak of “repatriation” to the “country that provided such germplasm.” (This may, or may not, be the country where the material was collected from *in situ* conditions.) One might presume that the “right” or privilege of receiving a duplicate of materials that a country once donated would be extended to countries that are non-Parties as well as to Contracting Parties to the Treaty. This subject will need to be addressed in preparing the agreements with the Governing Body on the terms under which the centers will adhere to the Treaty. It is understood that centers will not always know where the material was collected in *in situ* conditions (just as they were not able always to identify the country that provided the material). The practical impact of this distinction between the two agreements may not be substantial. The material will be available in any case, the question is simply whether the MTA applies or not.

**15.1.(b)(iii) Benefits arising under the above MTA that accrue to the mechanism mentioned in Article 19.3(f) shall be applied, in particular, to the conservation and sustainable use of the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture in question, particularly in national and regional programmes in developing countries and countries with economies in transition, especially in centres of diversity and the least developed countries; and**

Article 15.1.(b) (iii) specifies that benefits that arise as a result of the MTA will be applied, in particular to purposes specified in the paragraph. In other words, if a germplasm recipient uses the received materials in ways that trigger the benefit-sharing provisions of the MTA, then the funds generated will be directed towards conservation and sustainable use in certain kinds of countries. This is not so much a requirement on CGIAR centers as it is a mandate for the Governing Body and Secretariat concerning how incoming funds will be spent.

**15.1.(b)(iv) The IARCs shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with their capacity, to maintain effective compliance with the conditions of the MTAs, and shall promptly inform the Governing Body of cases of non-compliance.**

Article 15.1.(b) (iv) addresses the issue of the responsibilities of centers for maintaining compliance with the terms of the MTAs. This paragraph, which covers non-Annex I PGRFA, is substantially similar to the agreement already in place between FAO and the CGIAR centers, and our interpretation is that the Treaty language does not impose any new or different obligations on centers. In the current agreement with FAO, centers are not required, for instance, to monitor compliance, nor are they are required to enforce compliance, for example, by resorting to legal action (see the First and Second Joint Statements). In negotiations on the paragraph above, the word “maintain” was substituted for the word “ensure,” that was found in an earlier draft. This change indicates that countries do not expect centers to guarantee compliance; they simply expect centers to distribute materials properly, under the standard MTA, and report cases of non-compliance when these come to the attention of the centers. The negotiations did not specifically address the question of how compliance with the MTAs (used

for Annex I as well as non-Annex I materials) will be *enforced* or who, if anyone, will have that responsibility. Given the costs of monitoring and legal enforcement, one might assume that the system will be largely self-regulating, and that egregious violations will be discouraged through non-legal means and by the threat of bad publicity, much the way they are at present. This approach has produced a very high level of compliance with the MTAs currently in use by centers.<sup>11</sup> In keeping with the current agreement with FAO which does not oblige centers to engage in legal actions in cases of perceived MTA violations (but reserves the right to do so), it is assumed that centers would not be required to enforce MTA legally. This matter might be clarified in a statement associated with an agreement with the Governing Body.

Paragraphs 15.1.(c) through (g) apply to all center-held materials covered by the Treaty. Each of these five paragraphs finds a precedent in the existing agreements with FAO, indeed the language in those agreements was used as the basis in drafting this section of the Treaty. For ease of comparison, the table below provides the relevant reference for each paragraph:

<b>Treaty Text</b>	<b>Corresponding Paragraph in FAO-CGIAR Agreements</b>
15.1.(c)	Article 6
15.1.(d)	Article 4(a) and Article 5(a)
15.1.(e)	Article 5(b) and Article 7(b)
15.1.(f)	Article 4(b)
15.1.(g)	Article 5(c)

**15.1.(c) IARCs recognize the authority of the Governing Body to provide policy guidance relating to *ex situ* collections held by them and subject to the provisions of this Treaty.**

**15.1.(d) The scientific and technical facilities in which such *ex situ* collections are conserved shall remain under the authority of the IARCs, which undertake to manage and administer these *ex situ* collections in accordance with internationally accepted standards, in particular the Genebank Standards as endorsed by the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture.**

**15.1.(e) Upon request by an IARC, the Secretary shall endeavour to provide appropriate technical support.**

**15.1.(f) The Secretary shall have, at any time, right of access to the facilities, as well as right to inspect all activities performed therein directly related to the conservation and exchange of the material covered by this Article.**

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<sup>11</sup> It should be noted that Article 12.5 requires Contracting Parties to provide recourse procedures (particularly in relation to the enforcement of the MTAs), and Article 21 provides for “procedures and mechanisms,” including legal advice and legal assistance to developing countries in support of compliance.

**15.1.(g) If the orderly maintenance of these *ex situ* collections held by IARCs is impeded or threatened by whatever event, including *force majeure*, the Secretary, with the approval of the host country, shall assist in its evacuation or transfer, to the extent possible.**

The most obvious change in wording in the above paragraphs between the existing FAO-CGIAR Agreements and the Treaty is in Article 15.1(c). The FAO-CGIAR Agreements speak of the centers recognizing the authority of FAO and its Commission “in setting policies” for the International Network. The Treaty refers (more accurately, perhaps) to the authority of the Governing Body to “provide policy guidance” relating to the *ex situ* collections held by the centers and covered by the Treaty. Earlier text – rejected in the negotiations – would have acknowledged the authority of the Governing Body to set policies for the CGIAR centers. This was considered too expansive and too extreme. The rejection of such language, of course, provides insight into the intentions of countries concerning this issue.

In effect, however, the change between the Treaty language and the FAO-CGIAR Agreement language is largely cosmetic. Centers will continue to welcome the policy advice of governments, collectively expressed through the Governing Body and the FAO Commission, and will fail to heed that advice at their own peril. In practice, “guidance” has rarely, if ever, been given. Indeed, centers have sought guidance (e.g., on an interpretation of the phrase “germplasm and related information” in the FAO-CGIAR Agreements) on a number of occasions without ever getting it. Thus, we might conclude that this paragraph is an appropriate recognition of the role of the Governing Body vis-à-vis materials that are held by centers, but over which centers claim no ownership.

**15.2 The Contracting Parties agree to provide facilitated access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture in Annex I under the Multilateral System to IARCs of the CGIAR that have signed agreements with the Governing Body in accordance with this Treaty. Such Centres shall be included in a list held by the Secretary to be made available to the Contracting Parties on request.**

Article 15.2 provides for “reciprocity” by requiring Contracting Parties to provide centers with “facilitated access” to PGRFA covered by Annex I. The phrase “facilitated access” is used in describing what Contracting Parties are required to provide to each other, and thus this paragraph provides that access will be provided to centers under the same arrangements as those for governments that are Contracting Parties to the Treaty. It is hoped that this will facilitate the centers’ collecting work.

**15.3 The material other than that listed in Annex I, which is received and conserved by IARCs after the coming into force of this Treaty, shall be available for access on terms consistent with those mutually agreed between the IARCs that receive the material and the country of origin of such resources or the country that has acquired those resources in accordance with the Convention on Biological Diversity or other applicable law.**

Article 15.3 simply expresses existing policy within the CGIAR, namely that centers now acquire new materials in accordance with the terms of the Convention on Biological Diversity (i.e., with “prior informed consent,” and on the basis of “mutually agreed terms”). Subsequent distributions of such materials are in accordance with the terms agreed at the time of acquisition. Thus, this paragraph simply requires that centers continue to observe this practice, which is consistent with the Convention. This approach could, in addition to non-Annex I materials, also apply to those Annex I materials collected in the past “with strings attached,” particularly if acquired from non-Contracting Parties.

**15.4 The Contracting Parties are encouraged to provide IARCs that have signed agreements with the Governing Body with access, on mutually agreed terms, to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture not listed in Annex I that are important to the programmes and activities of the IARCs.**

Article 15.4. provides centers with a tool unavailable to Contracting Parties to the Treaty. This paragraph implicitly acknowledges the importance of center research on non-Annex I crops. It encourages Contracting Parties to provide access to PGRFA of these crops. While it is unfortunate that some crops of importance to the CGIAR were not included in Annex I, Article 15.4. provides some solace. Presumably, centers will be able to report to the Governing Body on their experiences with gaining access to non-Annex I materials, and in this way will be able further to encourage compliance with this provision.

**15.5 The Governing Body will also seek to establish agreements for the purposes stated in this Article with other relevant international institutions.**

Article 15.5. is self-explanatory. As stated, the Governing Body may establish agreements with other institutions in conformity with Article 15.

## **The Multilateral System: Access and Benefit-Sharing**

### **Overview**

The Treaty establishes a Multilateral System with rules for access and benefit-sharing for genetic resources (of a defined list of crops) and associated information. Access is provided to *ex situ* and *in situ* materials, other than those under development during the period of development. The Treaty does not cover access for purposes that are not related to food and agriculture. Intellectual property rights are respected. IPRs may not be claimed, however, on material “in the form received” from the system. (Some uncertainty exists as to what that means, precisely, and the Interim Committee and ultimately the Governing Body may need to clarify these matters.) PGRFA will be provided under the terms of a standard, yet-to-be-agreed Material Transfer Agreement to be used by Contracting Parties and centers. Benefit-sharing in the form of a payment into an international fund at FAO will be mandatory when genetic material from the system is used to produce a “product that is a PGRFA” (e.g., a line or cultivar) that is commercialized, unless this product is made available without restriction for further research and development. In effect, patenting will trigger the benefit-sharing mechanism; plant breeders rights will not.

Part IV of the Treaty is entitled “The Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-Sharing.” Part IV contains Article 10 establishing the multilateral system as well as specific articles on coverage, access, and benefit-sharing. As specified in Article 15 on the CGIAR collections, centers will provide and obtain access to Annex I materials in accordance with the terms of Part IV of the Treaty.

**10.1 In their relationships with other States, the Contracting Parties recognize the sovereign rights of States over their own plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, including that the authority to determine access to those resources rests with national governments and is subject to national legislation.**

**10.2 In the exercise of their sovereign rights, the Contracting Parties agree to establish a multilateral system, which is efficient, effective, and transparent, both to facilitate access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, and to share, in a fair and equitable way, the benefits arising from the utilization of these resources, on a complementary and mutually reinforcing basis.**

Article 10 establishes the multilateral system. In this article, Contracting Parties specifically assert that they are exercising their sovereign rights (as the Convention on Biological Diversity reaffirms that they have over their genetic resources) to establish this multilateral system. This article thus provides a link with the Convention, and makes clear that the rules governing access and benefit-sharing for the multilateral system will be the “mutually agreed terms” referred to in the Convention. In short, countries state that the Treaty is in harmony with the CBD.

Leaving aside for the moment, Article 11 on coverage, we shall begin our detailed analysis with Article 12 which addresses the topic of access to PGRFA within the multilateral system – to materials of crops contained in Annex I. This article covers both materials found in *ex situ* and in *in situ* conditions.

## Access

**12.1 The Contracting Parties agree that facilitated access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture under the Multilateral System, as defined in Article 11, shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.**

**12.2 The Contracting Parties agree to take the necessary legal or other appropriate measures to provide such access to other Contracting Parties through the Multilateral System. To this effect, such access shall also be provided to legal and natural persons under the jurisdiction of any Contracting Party, subject to the provisions of Article 11.4.**

**12.3 Such access shall be provided in accordance with the conditions below:**

**12.3(a) Access shall be provided solely for the purpose of utilization and conservation for research, breeding and training for food and agriculture, provided that such purpose does not include chemical, pharmaceutical and/or other non-food/feed industrial uses. In the case of multiple-use crops (food and non-food), their importance for food security should be the determinant for their inclusion in the Multilateral System and availability for facilitated access.**

Article 12.2. notes that facilitated access shall be provided to Contracting Parties, as well as to “legal and natural persons” under the jurisdiction of any Contracting Party. This means that access will be provided to individuals as well as to institutions or organizations that have a “legal personality,” such as private companies, NGOs, etc.

Article 12.3 lays out the conditions under which facilitated access is granted. Specifically, it is granted for purposes that relate to food and agriculture. Access for other purposes (e.g., pharmaceutical, chemical) is not covered by this Treaty, meaning that those seeking access for such purposes will need to make separate arrangements. In most cases, such access will effectively fall under the framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Access may even be denied.

Article 12.3(a) does not specifically sanction access for the purpose of direct use, but one might assume that such access is acceptable. Currently, the Material Transfer Agreement (MTA) used under the FAO-CGIAR Agreements allows for access for such purposes. This provision is used, for example in cases where an accession that is desired for a particular niche market (a colorful potato, for instance) and no further breeding work is needed, as well as in cases where the crop itself is the subject of little breeding work, e.g., pulses.

**12.3(b) Access shall be accorded expeditiously, without the need to track individual accessions and free of charge, or, when a fee is charged, it shall not exceed the minimal cost involved;**

**12.3(c) All available passport data and, subject to applicable law, any other associated available non-confidential descriptive information, shall be made available with the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture provided;**

**12.3(d) Recipients shall not claim any intellectual property or other rights that limit the facilitated access to the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, or their genetic parts or components, in the form received from the Multilateral System;**

**12.3(e) Access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture under development, including material being developed by farmers, shall be at the discretion of its developer, during the period of its development;**

**12.3(f) Access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture protected by intellectual and other property rights shall be consistent with relevant international agreements, and with relevant national laws;**

**12.3(g) Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture accessed under the Multilateral System and conserved shall continue to be made available to the Multilateral System by the recipients of those plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, under the terms of this Treaty; and**

**12.3(h) Without prejudice to the other provisions under this Article, the Contracting Parties agree that access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture found in *in situ* conditions will be provided according to national legislation or, in the absence of such legislation, in accordance with such standards as may be set by the Governing Body.**

Paragraphs 12.3(b) through (h) specify additional conditions under which access is provided and identify circumstances under which access might be denied legitimately.

Several of these paragraphs are critical to the workings of the Multilateral System. In general, these paragraphs acknowledge the applicability of intellectual and other property rights over the material. They call for Contracting Parties to make available not just the genetic material, but also associated, descriptive – i.e., non-proprietary – information. This provision (and others discussed below, will apply to CGIAR centers as well).

Paragraph (b) specifies that those providing genetic resources need not track individual accessions.

Paragraph (c) specifies what types of information, in addition to the germplasm, shall be made available. Note that this subject is also addressed in Article 13.2(a).

Paragraph 12.3.d is a key one in trying to define the extent to which intellectual property rights (IPRs) can be applied to material accessed from the Multilateral System. However it contains a number of ambiguities and is open to interpretation, due in large part to the fact that important terms are left undefined and unclear. For example:

The phrase “ ... intellectual property or other rights that limit the facilitated access to the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, ... “ can be interpreted in two ways:

- that IPRs limit facilitated access and thus no intellectual property of any type can be claimed, or:
- that intellectual property can be taken out, provided it does not limit facilitated access (e.g. UPOV-compatible Plant Breeders rights could be claimed)

There is also some lack of clarity as to whether the facilitated access that might be limited by the taking out of IPRs, refers to limiting access to the original accession(s) (plus their genetic parts and components – however defined) or to the product of research and breeding using the material received.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty is the phrase “in the form received”. Does this allow IPRs to be taken out on, for example, genes isolated from the material received, because they were not received in the form of isolated genes? Or is this forbidden because the gene itself (provided no changes are made to it) was received from the Multilateral System, albeit embedded within the genetic makeup of the material?

Furthermore, the issue is left open as to what is the minimum that a recipient has to do for the material to no longer be classified as being “in the form received”. Is the addition of a single ‘cosmetic’ gene (e.g. through transformation or conventional back-crossing) sufficient? Is inclusion of an essentially unaltered gene within a new construct sufficient? Such issues will presumably be addressed by the Governing Body in due course, and some, perhaps, by the Commission on Genetic Resources acting as Interim Committee.

Paragraph (g) specifies that materials accessed should continue to remain available to the Multilateral System from the recipient (as long as the recipient has them).

Paragraph (h) confirms that access will also be provided to materials found in *in situ* conditions, although such access is to be provided according to national legislation. It is assumed that this national legislation deals with the mechanics of implementation (countries were concerned, for instance, with the modalities of access to materials in national parks and other protected or vulnerable areas) and not with the establishment of new requirements or conditions that are inconsistent with the Treaty. National legislation pertaining to *in situ* materials must allow for access if this provision is to be “without prejudice to the other provisions under this Article,” as the paragraph states.

As with proprietary information, Article 12 provides some exceptions to what kinds of genetic materials must be made available, and when. Contracting Parties and centers need not make genetic material “under development” available during its period of development. While the intention of the paragraph (Article 12.3(e)) may be reasonably clear, the wording of this provision is problematic in that it does not specify what “under development” means, nor does it define when the “period” of development ends. (This issue will be discussed in more detail later.)

Paragraph (f) specifies that materials protected by IPRs will be made available in a manner consistent with those rights.

None of the paragraphs make specific reference to practical implementation points that may concern the Centers such as whether there is an obligation to transfer diseased materials in

contradiction of quarantine laws and regulations. This latter point, however, might be dealt with in communications or agreements between the centers and the Governing Body as it was in the case of joint statements under the 1994 Agreements with FAO.

**12.4 To this effect, facilitated access, in accordance with Articles 12.2 and 12.3 above, shall be provided pursuant to a standard material transfer agreement (MTA), which shall be adopted by the Governing Body and contain the provisions of Articles 12.3(a), d and g, as well as the benefit-sharing provisions set forth in Article 13.2(d)(ii) and other relevant provisions of this Treaty, and the provision that the recipient of the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture shall require that the conditions of the MTA shall apply to the transfer of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture to another person or entity, as well as to any subsequent transfers of those plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.**

Paragraph 12.4 mandates the use of a standard Material Transfer Agreement – a system very similar to that used by CGIAR centers today. The MTA would bind the recipient of Annex I PGRFA to certain conditions and would require that recipient to pass on these obligations to any subsequent recipient. The Treaty does not specify the form of the MTA, whether it is to be signed or, like the MTA used by centers, employ the “software” approach. Informally, CGIAR representatives have argued that signed MTAs (a.) add to the bureaucracy of implementation, (b.) provide no additional or significant legal advantages and that recourse to the courts is rarely the route taken in cases of infringement in any case, and (c.) the procedures involved in obtaining signatures in many countries result in inhibiting flows of germplasm.

The main provisions of the MTA will deal with IPRs and with the benefit-sharing requirement, discussed above. The precise content of the MTA, and thus both the “formula” for benefit-sharing and the procedures for administering the MTAs, is not specified by the Treaty. These matters were left to the Governing Body to decide. Article 13 on Benefit-Sharing specifies that the “form and manner of payment,” will be determined “in line with commercial practice,” by the Governing Body at its first meeting, which will take place within a year of the Treaty’s coming into force. It is important to point out that these decisions, like all decisions by the Governing Body, must be taken by consensus (unless, by consensus, they decide on another method).

**12.5 Contracting Parties shall ensure that an opportunity to seek recourse is available, consistent with applicable jurisdictional requirements, under their legal systems, in case of contractual disputes arising under such MTAs, recognizing that obligations arising under such MTAs rest exclusively with the parties to those MTAs.**

**12.6 In emergency disaster situations, the Contracting Parties agree to provide facilitated access to appropriate plant genetic resources for food and agriculture in the Multilateral System for the purpose of contributing to the re-establishment of agricultural systems, in cooperation with disaster relief co-ordinators.**

Paragraph 12.5 simply states that Contracting Parties will ensure that there is some mechanism in their legal system for addressing violations of the MTA. (It should be noted that the Treaty does not specify the legal jurisdiction applicable to the MTA. Often contracts, such as MTAs, would do this, saying, for example, that in the case of a dispute, the relevant laws of a named country would apply.) Paragraph 12.5 is tied to Article 21 on compliance. Article 21 provides for legal assistance and advice to be made available, presumably by the Governing Body.

Paragraph 12.6 provides for the provision of materials needed to re-establish agricultural systems in disaster situations regardless of whether the recipients are Contracting Parties to the Treaty or not. This paragraph was drafted in support of the Global Plan of Action, which has an “Activity” devoted to this issue.

### Benefit-Sharing

The Treaty’s article on Benefit-Sharing (Article 13) recognizes that access itself is a major benefit of the Multilateral System, and states that benefits arising from the use of PGRFA under the Multilateral System should be shared fairly and equitably through a number of mechanisms, both voluntary and mandatory in nature.

Contracting Parties agree, for example, to “provide and/or facilitate access to technologies for the conservation, characterization, evaluation and use of plant genetic resources...” This particular paragraph (13.2.(b)(i)) encourages the transfer of technologies including those that are essentially “embedded” in genetic materials. But, the transfer is not mandatory, and respect for property rights is specifically accommodated. The “requirements,” such as they are, for this mechanism of benefit-sharing will appear as “business as usual” to most CGIAR centers – as something they are accustomed to making available.

Likewise, Article 13 encourages (but does not set forth enforceable requirements for) capacity-building in developing countries and countries with economies in transition. Elements identified in the article include training, strengthening of facilities and the carrying out of research in these countries. All of these are already part of the modus operandi of CGIAR centers.

**13.2 (a) The Contracting Parties agree to make available information which shall, *inter alia*, encompass catalogues and inventories, information on technologies, results of technical, scientific and socio-economic research, including characterization, evaluation and utilization, regarding those plant genetic resources for food and agriculture under the Multilateral System. Such information shall be made available, where non-confidential, subject to applicable law and in accordance with national capabilities. Such information shall be made available to all Contracting Parties to this Treaty through the information system, provided for in Article 17.**

The more mandatory requirement to share information about the PGRFA covered by the Multilateral System, will also strike most centers as being completely consistent with prevailing

practices. The relevant paragraph, 13.2.(a), requires Contracting Parties (and centers) to make available catalogues, inventories, socio-economic research, as well as characterization, evaluation, and utilization data. Confidential and proprietary information is not covered by this mandatory requirement. And, all transfers are contingent on and subject to any relevant intellectual property rights.

**13.2 (d)(ii) The Contracting Parties agree that the standard Material Transfer Agreement referred to in Article 12.4 shall include a requirement that a recipient who commercializes a product that is a plant genetic resource for food and agriculture and that incorporates material accessed from the Multilateral System, shall pay to the mechanism referred to in Article 19.3f, an equitable share of the benefits arising from the commercialization of that product, except whenever such a product is available without restriction to others for further research and breeding, in which case the recipient who commercializes shall be encouraged to make such payment.**

**The Governing Body shall, at its first meeting, determine the level, form and manner of the payment, in line with commercial practice. The Governing Body may decide to establish different levels of payment for various categories of recipients who commercialize such products; it may also decide on the need to exempt from such payments small farmers in developing countries and in countries with economies in transition. The Governing Body may, from time to time, review the levels of payment with a view to achieving fair and equitable sharing of benefits, and it may also assess, within a period of five years from the entry into force of this Treaty, whether the mandatory payment requirement in the MTA shall apply also in cases where such commercialized products are available without restriction to others for further research and breeding.**

Article 13.2(d)(ii) is arguably the most interesting and controversial provision related to benefit-sharing. This paragraph lays out a mandatory benefit-sharing scheme connected to the commercialization of PGRFA incorporating materials from the Multilateral System. The previously-mentioned MTA will contain the benefit-sharing requirement and will bind the recipient of germplasm from the system to provide monetary benefits in certain circumstances.

When a recipient receives material from the Multilateral System and uses that material to produce a commercial product that “is a PGRFA,”<sup>12</sup> then the recipient will be obliged to pay “an equitable share of the benefits arising from the commercialization of that product...” This requirement, it should be understood, will not apply to the commercialization of a product, such as a breakfast cereal containing wheat produced by a variety incorporating material obtained from the Multilateral System. The requirement will, however, apply to the variety – to the *plant genetic resource* - that has been commercialized. The Governing Body, at its first meeting, is supposed to determine “the level, form and manner of the payment, in line with commercial practice.” The payment will be made into a mechanism such as a trust fund established at FAO

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<sup>12</sup> See the discussion in this paper on the ambiguities in the definition of this important term.

and controlled by the Governing Body. This fund would be used to support activities consistent with the goals of the Treaty, taking into consideration the Global Plan of Action. The benefits, according to the Treaty, should flow “primarily, directly and indirectly, to farmers...” At its first meeting the Governing Body (see Article 13.4) will “consider relevant policy and criteria for specific assistance under the agreed funding strategy.”

Article 13.4. makes reference to a “funding strategy” established under Article 18. In Article 18, Parties agree to “undertake to implement a funding strategy for the implementation of this Treaty...” While Article 18 will be discussed in somewhat more detail below, it should be noted here that encouragement is given in Article 18 to the funding of the kinds of activities being undertaken in most crop-related CGIAR centers. At the least, this means that centers should consider their programmes to be an example of the types of benefits expected to be generated by and supported under the umbrella of the Multilateral System.

There is one exception to the requirement to make a monetary payment, and it is a big exception. When the product – for example, the new crop variety – is made available “without restriction to others for further research and breeding,” no payment is required, though it is encouraged. In practice, this means that varieties incorporating material from the Multilateral System that are protected by UPOV-styled Plant Breeders Rights, will not be subject to mandatory, monetary benefit-sharing. Why? Because, such varieties are freely available for further research and breeding. Varieties and other materials that are protected by utility patents, however, will be subject to the benefit-sharing requirement, however, because most patent laws restrict the use of the patented invention for research as well as for use as a breeding material. Presumably, a patent holder could renounce certain rights afforded by a patent and thus escape the mandatory benefit-sharing provision. For example, one could patent a variety or line and then grant any and everyone a license to use the material freely for research and breeding. So-called “protective patenting” would, in our view, not necessarily trigger Article 13’s monetary benefit-sharing requirement, but this may need clarification by the Governing Body.

One would anticipate that Article 13.2.(d)(ii) would rarely apply to CGIAR centers, because they will almost never be a “recipient who commercializes a product.” (The extent to which those who use germplasm obtained from the centers will be obliged to make payments will depend on whether the material they get from the center was part of the Multilateral System.) Because CGIAR centers have their own independent legal status and will sign separate agreements with the Governing Body, access of materials by one center from another center (like access by a Contracting Party from a center) will be considered as access from the multilateral system. An MTA would be required for such a transfer, though it is reasonably certain that an “umbrella” MTA could be devised and agreed for such transfers to reduce paperwork.

Transfers within a center (e.g., from the genebank to a breeder or researcher) would not, in our opinion, be considered an act of access from the multilateral system. In effect, this would be a transfer from one “legal person” to the same “legal person.” Opinions are divided, however, as to whether a breeder from a company or institution would or would not be obtaining materials

from the multilateral system were he/she to get materials from his/her national genebank.<sup>13</sup> At the least, access from the multilateral system involves an international transfer of materials, with the exception that access by a center from a genebank in the host country would, of course, be considered access from the Multilateral System, assuming that country is a Contracting Party.

Though internal transfers may not be considered as involving the Multilateral System, CGIAR centers are in a rather different situation than Contracting Parties. Centers claim no ownership over the materials, and they are holding the materials in trust. It might be advisable, therefore, for centers to agree to employ the benefit-sharing provisions of the treaty were they to commercialize PGRFA developed on the basis of materials in their genebank, and protect these in such a way as to limit further access and use for research and breeding. Likewise, the provision of products of center research might be made contingent on the acceptance of the standard benefit-sharing provisions developed by the Governing Body and contained in the future MTA.

In stating that the Governing Body will determine the “level, form and manner of payment...” we may assume that the centers themselves will not be involved in negotiating the MTAs in any way. Centers will simply distribute materials with an MTA, but will not themselves determine what payments, if any, a recipient should subsequently make. If centers wish further reassurance of this interpretation, text could be drafted for the anticipated joint statement.

As the second paragraph of 13.2(d)(ii) notes, the Governing Body may elect to establish different levels of payments for different categories of users that commercialize products covered by this article. It will also review the level of payments from time to time. And, within 5 years of the Treaty coming into force, the Governing Body will specifically examine whether the system of mandatory payments should be extended to cover products that are available without restriction for further research and breeding. Given the fact that such a decision to expand the scope of the mandatory benefit-sharing scheme would have to be made by consensus, the likelihood of the Governing Body taking this step would appear slim at this point.

Finally, Contracting Parties have agreed (in Article 13.6) at some unspecified point in the future to consider “modalities of a strategy of voluntary benefit-sharing contributions” from food processing industries. Again, it does not appear that this provision is going to lead to an expansion of mandatory benefit-sharing.

### **The Scope of the Multilateral System**

<b>Overview</b>
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<sup>13</sup> If such access is *not* access from the Multilateral System then a big loophole would be created, as materials could be obtained within-country and then passed to others internationally without an MTA.

The Multilateral System covers PGRFA that is in the public domain and is under the management and control of the Contracting Parties. Approximately 35 crops and a modest number of forage species are affected by the provisions of the Multilateral System. Soybean, groundnut, sugarcane, tomato and most tropical forages are excluded from the system. Certain species that are part of the genepool used by breeders of cassava, potato and common beans are also excluded. CGIAR centers, in agreements or statements with the Governing Body, will be able to clarify certain technical matters pertaining to which materials they hold are part of the Multilateral System and subject to its provisions.

The Multilateral System includes “all PGRFA listed in Annex I that are under the management and control of the Contracting Parties and in the public domain” (Article 11.2). Contracting Parties (countries) agree to encourage the private sector and other relevant organizations within their jurisdiction to include such materials in the Multilateral System. In effect this means that the Multilateral System contains materials under government control and in the public domain, in addition to such materials that others might voluntarily put under the system. Within two years of entry into force, the Governing Body will assess progress in getting such materials into the system.

**11.5. The Multilateral System shall also include the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture listed in Annex I and held in the *ex situ* collections of the International Agricultural Research Centres of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), as provided in Article 15.1(a), and in other international institutions, in accordance with Article 15.5.**

Paragraph 11.5 specifically addresses the *ex situ* collections of the CGIAR centers:

This paragraph must be interpreted consistently with the provisions of the rest of the Treaty, including those relating to the coverage of the Multilateral System and conditions of access, and the provisions relating to the CG collections. In other words, for example, provisions that access to materials “under development” should be at the discretion of the developer would still apply even though this paragraph does not specifically state that. Also, the reference to the inclusion of the *ex situ* collections of the Centers includes the proviso that agreements need to be signed between the Centers and the Governing Body for those collections to be included in the Multilateral System. This in turn allows for clarifications to be made about what is and is not covered by the Multilateral System. This is an opportunity, if needed, to make transparent which types or categories of materials are in the system, and which are not, either through the wording of the Agreements between the Centers and the Governing Body or through joint statements made in conjunction therewith.

As is well known, negotiators debated the content of Annex I extensively and vigorously. Early on, they agreed in principle that crops included in the Multilateral System would be those important for food security and for which countries were interdependent. Such criteria, as valid as they might be, do not provide a formula for inclusion/exclusion, and thus the selection of crops from beginning to end was highly politicized. The formal position of the CGIAR centers

was that at a minimum, all crops that were the subject of formal genetic improvement efforts in the centers should be included in Annex I. The initial negotiating position of regions had some favoring as few as 6 crops for the Multilateral System, while another favored more than 250. As the list was to be agreed “by consensus,” negotiations began with the list of 6 crops and expanded largely as a result of countries’ becoming convinced of the need to include most of the crops of interest to the CGIAR within the Multilateral System.

The list of crops in Annex I contains some 35 crops (or in the case of *Brassicas*, crop complexes) and a number of forages. Significantly, it excludes certain crops important to one or more centers: soybean, groundnut, and most tropical forages.

## ANNEX I

## LIST OF CROPS COVERED UNDER THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM

## Food crops

Crop	Genus	Observations
Breadfruit	<i>Artocarpus</i>	Breadfruit only.
Asparagus	<i>Asparagus</i>	
Oat	<i>Avena</i>	
Beet	<i>Beta</i>	
Brassica complex	<i>Brassica</i> et al.	Genera included are: <i>Brassica</i> , <i>Armoracia</i> , <i>Barbarea</i> , <i>Camelina</i> , <i>Crambe</i> , <i>Diplotaxis</i> , <i>Eruca</i> , <i>Isatis</i> , <i>Lepidium</i> , <i>Raphanobrassica</i> , <i>Raphanus</i> , <i>Rorippa</i> , and <i>Sinapis</i> . This comprises oilseed and vegetable crops such as cabbage, rapeseed, mustard, cress, rocket, radish, and turnip. The species <i>Lepidium meyenii</i> (maca) is excluded.
Pigeon Pea	<i>Cajanus</i>	
Chickpea	<i>Cicer</i>	
Citrus	<i>Citrus</i>	Genera <i>Poncirus</i> and <i>Fortunella</i> are included as root stock.
Coconut	<i>Cocos</i>	
Major aroids	<i>Colocasia</i> , <i>Xanthosoma</i>	Major aroids include taro, cocoyam, dasheen and tannia.
Carrot	<i>Daucus</i>	
Yams	<i>Dioscorea</i>	
Finger Millet	<i>Eleusine</i>	
Strawberry	<i>Fragaria</i>	
Sunflower	<i>Helianthus</i>	
Barley	<i>Hordeum</i>	
Sweet Potato	<i>Ipomoea</i>	
Grass pea	<i>Lathyrus</i>	
Lentil	<i>Lens</i>	
Apple	<i>Malus</i>	
Cassava	<i>Manihot</i>	<i>Manihot esculenta</i> only.
Banana / Plantain	<i>Musa</i>	Except <i>Musa textilis</i> .
Rice	<i>Oryza</i>	
Pearl Millet	<i>Pennisetum</i>	
Beans	<i>Phaseolus</i>	Except <i>Phaseolus polyanthus</i> .
Pea	<i>Pisum</i>	
Rye	<i>Secale</i>	
Potato	<i>Solanum</i>	Section <i>tuberosa</i> included, except <i>Solanum phureja</i> .
Eggplant	<i>Solanum</i>	Section <i>melongena</i> included.
Sorghum	<i>Sorghum</i>	

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<b>Crop</b>	<b>Genus</b>	<b>Observations</b>
Triticale	<i>Triticosecale</i>	
Wheat	<i>Triticum</i> et al.	Including <i>Agropyron</i> , <i>Elymus</i> , and <i>Secale</i> .
Faba Bean / Vetch	<i>Vicia</i>	
Cowpea et al.	<i>Vigna</i>	
Maize	<i>Zea</i>	Excluding <i>Zea perennis</i> , <i>Zea diploperennis</i> , and <i>Zea luxurians</i> .

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**Forages**

<b>Genera</b>	<b>Species</b>
<b>LEGUME FORAGES</b>	
<i>Astragalus</i>	<i>chinensis, cicer, arenarius</i>
<i>Canavalia</i>	<i>Ensiformis</i>
<i>Coronilla</i>	<i>Varia</i>
<i>Hedysarum</i>	<i>coronararium</i>
<i>Lathyrus</i>	<i>cicera, ciliolatus, hirsutus, ochrus, odoratus, sativus</i>
<i>Lespedeza</i>	<i>cuneata, striata, stipulacea</i>
<i>Lotus</i>	<i>corniculatus, subbiflorus, uliginosus</i>
<i>Lupinus</i>	<i>albus, angustifolius, luteus</i>
<i>Medicago</i>	<i>arborea, falcata, sativa, scutellata, rigidula, truncatula</i>
<i>Melilotus</i>	<i>albus, officinalis</i>
<i>Onobrychis</i>	<i>viciifolia</i>
<i>Ornithopus</i>	<i>sativus</i>
<i>Prosopis</i>	<i>affinis, alba, chilensis, nigra, pallida</i>
<i>Pueraria</i>	<i>phaseoloides</i>
<i>Trifolium</i>	<i>alexandrinum, alpestre, ambiguum, angustifolium, arvense, agrocicerum, hybridum, incarnatum, pratense, repens, resupinatum, rueppellianum, semipilosum, subterraneum, vesiculosum</i>
<b>GRASS FORAGES</b>	
<i>Andropogon</i>	<i>gayanus</i>
<i>Agropyron</i>	<i>cristatum, desertorum</i>
<i>Agrostis</i>	<i>stolonifera, tenuis</i>
<i>Alopecurus</i>	<i>pratensis</i>
<i>Arrhenatherum</i>	<i>elatius</i>
<i>Dactylis</i>	<i>glomerata</i>
<i>Festuca</i>	<i>arundinacea, gigantea, heterophylla, ovina, pratensis, rubra</i>
<i>Lolium</i>	<i>hybridum, multiflorum, perenne, rigidum, temulentum</i>
<i>Phalaris</i>	<i>aquatica, arundinacea</i>
<i>Phleum</i>	<i>pratense</i>
<i>Poa</i>	<i>alpina, annua, pratensis</i>
<i>Tripsacum</i>	<i>laxum</i>
<b>OTHER FORAGES</b>	
<i>Atriplex</i>	<i>halimus, nummularia</i>
<i>Salsola</i>	<i>vermiculata</i>



In addition to the problem of which crops to include, negotiators faced the related problem of how to define each crop in operational terms such that one might know, rather precisely, what was and was not covered. There was never any doubt that wheat would be included in the Multilateral System. But, what, precisely, does “wheat” really mean? IPGRI assisted in organizing panels of experts to provide scientific information on these and other questions (such as which forage species are most important to food security). The advice of the experts was not always heeded. In the end, negotiators defined crops, often as much on the basis of political as scientific criteria, by genus/genera, noting whenever a particular genus or species was excluded.

In some cases, negotiators decided to exclude specific species associated with a crop, and in some cases the excluded species are ones typically considered part of the genepool that a breeder might use or want access to. Two examples would be *Phaseolus polyanthus* and *Solanum phureja*. The definition of cassava includes *Manihot esculenta* only, thus wild relatives now being used to increase protein content and improve disease resistance, are excluded. Finally, some definitions are simply ambiguous. For example, wheat is defined as “*Triticum* et al.”

Exclusion of a crop important to a CGIAR center may not be as problematic as it might first be assumed. Centers will continue to distribute these materials – probably under an MTA containing provisions identical or close to those found in the MTA that Contracting Parties and centers will be using for Annex I materials. However, access by centers to materials not found in Annex I, will almost certainly be more difficult than to materials that are included on the list. Though Article 15 encourages Contracting Parties to provide centers with non-Annex I materials that are important to the programmes of the centers, access will be at the discretion of the countries, who will set the terms of access, if they provide it at all.

Additionally, donors may question whether they wish to provide funding for work on crops that are not part of the Multilateral System – crops for which countries have decided to handle conservation, development and benefit-sharing individually or through bilateral arrangements. Unless countries are willing to provide centers with non-Annex I materials, center collections risk being “fixed in time.” Centers may therefore wish to discuss this situation with relevant countries, and within networks, and try to come to some agreement that will ensure continued flow of materials for conservation and development purposes.

Additions (and exclusions) to Annex I can be made by the Governing Body – by consensus. In all likelihood, the list of crops is “fixed” for some time.

### **General Provisions of the Treaty**

The foregoing analysis has focused on Article 15 that relates to CGIAR centers directly, as well as to the Treaty’s establishment of a multilateral system for access and benefit-sharing. The Treaty however, covers a number of general topics, and contains some 17 articles dealing with institutional matters such as the operations of the Governing Body, the Secretariat, etc. Below,

we provide a very brief description of the remaining articles. In each case, the number and title of the article is underlined for reference purposes.

### Preamble

The Preamble notes the importance of PGRFA and recognizes the contributions farmers have made in conserving and making available these resources. It describes the Global Plan of Action as the internationally agreed framework for PGRFA-related activities. Significantly, the Preamble states that the Treaty does not imply a change in the rights or obligations of Parties under other international agreements, and states that this is not meant to imply a hierarchy between this Treaty and other agreements. Finally, the Preamble notes that the Treaty will be within the framework of FAO, and operate under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution.

### Article 1. Objectives

The objectives are the conservation and sustainable use of PGRFA and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of their use. Article I notes that this is in harmony with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).

### Article 2. Use of Terms

Eight terms are defined. Most of the definitions are based, at least loosely, on those found in the CBD. In the final days of the negotiations, there was considerable debate over the definitions. The need to compromise influenced the wording of two definitions in particular. The compromise-induced ambiguity may become the source of problems in the future in determining what exactly is covered by certain provisions of the Treaty. The two “problematic” definitions:

“Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture” means any genetic material of plant origin of actual or potential value for food and agriculture.

“Genetic material” means any material of plant origin, including reproductive and vegetative propagating material, containing functional units of heredity.

In the latter definition, it may be unclear as to which clauses modify or “define” others, and this in turn could lead to confusion as to which materials are, for example, affected by the article on facilitated access to PGRFA.

Finally, it should be noted that some important terms are not defined. This may also lead to confusion and controversy. The best example of this involves a term used in Article 12.3(d) which states that “Recipients shall not claim any intellectual property or other rights that limit the facilitated access to the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, or their genetic parts or components, in the form received from the Multilateral System.” The term, “genetic parts or components,” is not defined, nor is the term, “in the form received.”

### Article 3. Scope

The Treaty relates to PGRFA. It is important to note that it covers more than just the crops in the Multilateral System (which is dealt with in Part IV of the Treaty). Other articles, for example, on conservation and sustainable use, international cooperation, the Global Plan of Action, networks, the Global Information System, and the funding strategy, are not limited to Multilateral System crops. This is important to realize in relation to the work of the centers on other crops.

#### Article 4. General Obligations

Parties must ensure that their laws and regulations conform to the obligations laid out in the Treaty.

#### Article 5. Conservation, Exploration, Collection, Characterization, Evaluation and Documentation of PGRFA

“Subject to national legislation,” Contracting Parties agree to undertake the above activities and to cooperate with each other. No firm obligations are contained in the article, nevertheless, the article sends signals about the priorities of countries. For instance, it states that Contracting Parties will “cooperate to promote the development of an efficient and sustainable system of *ex situ* conservation,” a commitment that is complemented by the CGIAR’s Global Conservation Trust.

#### Article 6. Sustainable Use of PGRFA

Contracting Parties commit to developing appropriate policy and legal measures to promote the sustainable use of PGRFA. The article provides examples of what these measures *may* include: policies promoting diverse farming systems (“as appropriate”), strengthening of research, base broadening, expanded use of local crops and varieties (“as appropriate”), reviewing breeding strategies and regulations regarding variety release and seed distribution, etc. As with many other articles, this article contains no specific “enforceable” obligations. However, for those who wish to use the contents as guidance or to encourage governments to undertake activities – e.g., base broadening – the encouragement and guidance is here.

#### Article 7. National Commitments and International Cooperation

Contracting Parties commit to integrating the activities referred to in Articles 5 and 6 into their agricultural and rural development programmes. International cooperation shall be directed in particular to capacity building in developing countries and countries with economies in transition, enhancing international activities (Article 7 mentions a number of activities that CGIAR centers are already undertaking), strengthening institutional arrangements, and implementing the Treaty’s funding strategy.

#### Article 8. Technical Assistance.

Parties agree to “promote the provision of technical assistance...”

#### Article 9. Farmers’ Rights

Historically, “Farmers’ Rights” has come to mean different things to different people. To some it is associated with a desire for a form of intellectual property rights for farmer-developed materials; to others it is a political slogan that leads to recognition of farmers’ contributions and more PGRFA-related activities of benefit to small, traditional farmers. Article 9, at least, “settles” the issue as regards to the “international” implications of the term. In Article 9, Contracting Parties recognize the contribution of farmers, but state that the responsibility for the realization of Farmers’ Rights rests with national governments. Each Contracting Party, “in accordance with their needs and priorities...as appropriate, and subject to national legislation” agrees to take measure to protect and promote Farmers’ Rights, including the protection of traditional

knowledge, the right to participate in benefit-sharing, and the right to participate in making decisions at the national level regarding PGRFA. As with other articles described above, the obligations are too vague and too conditioned by phrases such as “as appropriate” to amount to a firm commitment to do anything specific. Article 9.3 notes that “Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted to limit any rights that farmers have to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed/propagating material, subject to national law and as appropriate.” In other words, if they have rights, they have them; if they don’t, they don’t.

<Articles 10-13 are discussed in detail, above.>

#### Article 14. Global Plan of Action

Contracting Parties agree to promote the effective implementation of the GPA as an international framework for PGRFA-related efforts, taking into account Article 13 on Benefit-Sharing.

<Article 15 on the *Ex Situ* Collections of the CGIAR Centers is discussed in detail, above.>

#### Article 16. International Plant Genetic Resources Networks

The Treaty calls for existing networks to be strengthened and new networks to be developed to achieve complete coverage of PGRFA. Contracting Parties agree to encourage participation by all relevant institutions – government, private sector, NGO, research and breeding, etc.

#### Article 17. The Global Information System on PGRFA

Contracting Parties agree to cooperate to develop and strengthen a global information system, based on existing systems. (This may have implications for the CGIAR System-wide Information Network for Genetic Resources – SINGER). Contracting Parties are encouraged to provide information that would allow “early warnings” of hazards to PGRFA to be issued with a view to safeguarding the material. Finally, Contracting Parties agree to cooperate with the FAO Commission in making periodic reassessments of the state of the world’s PGRFA and to update the Global Plan of Action.

#### Article 18. Financial Resources

Contracting Parties agree to “undertake to implement a funding strategy for the implementation of this Treaty...” The Governing Body will periodically establish a target for such funding. Contracting Parties will take steps in other international mechanisms, funds and bodies (e.g., GEF, UNSP, IFAD, the WB) to ensure that “due priority and attention to the effective allocation of predictable and agreed resources” is given to the implementation of plans and programmes under the Treaty. Contracting Parties agree to accord due priority to PGRFA in their own plans and priorities. Voluntary contributions to the Treaty’s funding strategy are encouraged, and the Governing Body shall consider modalities of a strategy to encourage such contributions. Priority for funding will be given to “agreed plans and programmes for farmers”

in developing countries (especially in least developed countries) and in countries with economies in transition.

#### Article 19. Governing Body

The Governing Body consists of the Contracting Parties, i.e., those countries that have formally ratified the Treaty. (Countries that voted to adopt the Treaty at the FAO Conference in November 2001, or subsequently sign the Treaty, are *not* members of the Governing Body unless they also take the step of formally ratifying it. Ratification is the key.) The Governing Body provides policy direction and guidance, adopts plans, programmes and budgets, is empowered to establish subsidiary bodies (e.g., committees), etc. It will adopt a funding strategy at its first session, and will periodically set a target for this strategy, “taking the Global Plan of Action” into account. The Governing Body may also consider and adopt amendments to the Treaty. Article 19 states that the Governing Body will keep the Conference of the Parties to the CBD informed of its work.

The most controversial element in Article 19 concerns how decisions will be taken. According to the Article, “All decisions of the Governing Body shall be taken by consensus” unless, by consensus, another method is agreed. It remains to be seen whether this “one-country one-veto” approach will allow the Treaty to evolve, or even to resolve the contentious issues that are already on its agenda, such as the terms of benefit-sharing to be embodied in the standard Material Transfer Agreement. Similarly, enlargement of the list of crops in the Multilateral System, would seem unlikely in the near future given that unanimous approval would be needed for adding any crop.

Article 19 specifies that members of the UN and its specialized agencies that are not Contracting Parties to the Treaty have the right to be observers. The CGIAR is not automatically accorded observer status, but will receive it automatically unless one-third of the Contracting Parties present at a meeting object. In addition, the draft agreement with the Governing Body could contain a provision that invitations would automatically be extended to centers.

The Governing Body shall meet every two years, and shall be held back-to-back with meetings of the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources, if possible. Other meetings may be called, as necessary.

#### Article 20. Secretary

The Secretary shall be appointed by the Director-General of FAO. The Secretariat shall provide practical and administrative support for the Governing Body.

#### Article 21. Compliance

At its first session, the Governing Body shall consider and approve “cooperative and effective” operational mechanisms to promote compliance and to address issues of non-compliance. Examples of this (cited specifically in the article) might be monitoring and provision

of advice and assistance, including legal advice and assistance. Note: This Article's provisions, presumably, would indicate the Governing Body, through the Secretariat might have some responsibilities for, or at least may assist with promoting and ensuring MTA compliance.

#### Article 22. Settlement of Disputes

In the event of disputes between Contracting Parties, Contracting Parties shall seek solutions through negotiation. A third party might be recruited to mediate. Arbitration procedures are laid down in Annex II to the Treaty, and are typical for treaties. Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice is an option. Conciliation in accordance with Annex II is another, final, option.

#### Article 23. Amendments to the Treaty

Amendments may be proposed by any Contracting Party. All amendments will be made by consensus, and shall come into force 90 after approval.

#### Article 24. Annexes

Annexes are an integral (binding) part of the Treaty. Amendments to Annexes shall be by consensus.

### Article 25. Signature

The Treaty is open for signature (a tangible expression of support and intention to ratify) for one year. (The Treaty may, of course, be ratified by any country regardless of whether it has signed the Treaty within that year.)

### Article 26. Ratification, Acceptance or Approval

Instruments of ratification shall be deposited at FAO.

### Article 27. Accession

The Treaty is open for “accession” a legal term for ratification or approval that applies to countries that have not signed the Treaty in the year in which it is open for signature (see Article 25). Countries that exercise this option enjoy equal rights and status with those that sign and ratify – no distinction is made.

### Article 28. Entry into Force

The Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the 40<sup>th</sup> instrument of ratification or accession is deposited with FAO. Following this, the Treaty comes into effect for subsequent countries, 90 days after they ratify/approve the Treaty.

### Article 29. Member Organizations of FAO

This Article pertains to entities such as the European Community, and how it notifies the Body of its competence to speak for the group, or not, in meetings. Ratification by the EU, is not counted in addition to its member states when determining whether 40 countries have ratified the Treaty.

### Article 30. Reservations

No reservations may be made to the Treaty by Contracting Parties.

### Article 31. Non-Parties

The Contracting Parties agree to encourage non-Parties to accept the Treaty. This is the only mention of non-Parties in the Treaty. There was much discussion earlier of whether the Treaty would dictate the use of different (potentially discriminatory) treatment of non-Parties (in terms of access and benefit-sharing, for instance). In the end, the Treaty is silent on the issue. Presumably, this means that the Treaty does not govern or affect the dealings of Contracting Parties or centers with non-Parties.

### Article 32. Withdrawals

At any time after 2 years after the coming into force of the Treaty, Parties may withdraw by formally notifying FAO. Withdrawal takes effect one year after the receipt of such notification.

#### Article 33. Termination

If the number of Contracting Parties drops below 40, the Treaty will be automatically terminated

#### Article 34. Depositary

The Director-General of FAO shall be the Depositary of the Treaty.

#### Article 35. Authentic Texts

The official texts of the Treaty are in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish. Each is equally authentic.

### **Issues and Concerns**

#### **Overview**

As with most treaties, this Treaty contains ambiguities and instances where important text is open to conflicting interpretations. Major problems or challenges have been bequeathed to the Treaty's future Governing Body, which will attempt to resolve remaining issues *by consensus*. Until they do, ambiguities will remain, and Contracting Parties will implement the Treaty in light of their understanding of it. Lack of clarity will pose difficulties for CGIAR centers, but no more so than for the Contracting Parties themselves. CGIAR centers may avail themselves of two mechanisms for increasing the clarity of their association with the Treaty: the agreements they make with the Governing Body, and a statement issued in conjunction with these agreements.

Treaties are developed largely through political, not scientific, processes. This would seem so obvious as not to warrant comment. Nevertheless, with treaties addressing largely scientific topics, questions are inevitably raised about the quality of "science" found in the document: Don't they understand that...? Why didn't they...? Didn't our representatives explain that...? Look, these two paragraphs are contradictory! Why are the definitions of scientific terms so "political"?

The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture is the result of a long – and most would say, gruelling – series of political negotiations between countries. The first proposals for a legally-binding Treaty on the subject were made in 1981. The current round of negotiations commenced in 1994. During these negotiations, the CGIAR was officially an "observer," albeit, at times the only delegation of observers allowed to be present in negotiating sessions. Nevertheless, the CGIAR did not "have a vote," nor was there a possibility of formal

negotiations between, for example, the CGIAR and the countries. The negotiations were between States, and only between States. Center representatives could inform and attempt to persuade country delegates, but they could neither officially propose text, nor block text that was not to their liking.

The subject of the Treaty was, and remains, controversial, and the Treaty itself is the result of countless compromises. From anyone's vantage point, it is less than perfect. "Perfection," however, was never one of the options on the table. From any perspective, the Treaty contains ambiguities and unresolved problems, some of which were known and visible to negotiators, some of which were probably not.

What follows is an exploration of some of these ambiguities and problems, particularly (but by no means exclusively) as they might affect CGIAR center observance and implementation of the Treaty. Certain of these items will be resolvable within the context of agreements to be signed between the Centres and the Governing Body to bring their collections under the umbrella of the Treaty. In these agreements and any related instruments such as statements regarding implementation made at the time of signature, centers have the opportunity to address and resolve issues that concern them. Some issues, however, are probably beyond the centers' power to solve. Certain problems exist simply because negotiators could not agree on a solution and decided instead to move forward, accepting the fact that ambiguities exist and that future disputes will arise. Until countries clarify these matters in their relations with each other, we should not expect them to devise or accept solutions applicable only to the CGIAR.

#### Definitional issues.

There is lack of clarity about the precise meaning of certain terms used in the Treaty. This lack of clarity exists even in Article 2, where terms are defined. Uncertainties over the meaning of terms in the text will, of course, affect both countries and centers.

The most troubling ambiguities are those pertaining to what –precisely – is being accessed under the Multilateral System, how it can be used/protected, and under what conditions access might be denied or conditioned. Article 12.3.(d), for instance, states: "Recipients shall not claim any intellectual property or other rights that limit the facilitated access to the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, or their genetic parts or components, in the form received from the Multilateral System." The term "genetic parts and components" is not defined and would be subject to different interpretations. More problematic, is the term "in the form received." Some countries were of the opinion that this paragraph would preclude the kind of patenting of genes which is allowed in the United States, namely the patenting of an isolated, purified DNA molecule for which a function (utility) is identified. These countries claim that the patented gene is the same as that received. Others counter that the isolated and purified form is different than the "form received" from the Multilateral System.

Once it is determined that materials from the Multilateral System have been used in such a way as to trigger the mandatory benefit-sharing mechanism of the Treaty, Article 13.2.d(ii) says that the level, form and manner of the payment will be "in line with commercial practice." What

“commercial practice” is, remains to be defined. At this point, it is not clear whether Contracting Parties will try to define this in operational terms in the text of the yet-to-be-drafted Material Transfer Agreement, or whether they will decide to formulate guidelines, for instance. Unless precise royalty percentages are identified in the MTA, it is also not clear who will be authorized to make the final determination of an amount of payment due under 13.2.(d)(ii). Of course, some accessions will contribute more, quantitatively or qualitatively, to a final product, and thus one could envisage a system that would differentiate according to use. Such a system might require multiple royalty rates. These issues are likely to be addressed by negotiation within the Interim Committee and the Governing Body.

Given the fact that CGIAR centers make no claim of ownership over materials in the Multilateral System and are essentially in the position of providing services to that system, it would seem unlikely that they would be (or would want to be) placed in the position of negotiating the particulars of benefit-sharing with recipients of Annex I materials from center genebanks. Clarity on this point might be sought in the context of the agreements anticipated to be signed with the Governing Body.

Finally, in terms of definitional issues, we note Article 12.3(e) on access. This paragraph states that: “Access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture under development, including material being developed by farmers, shall be at the discretion of its developer, during the period of its development.” What does “during the period of its development” mean? When does this period begin and end? What actions constitute “development”? Presumably, certain normal practices would be allowed, for the example the development and retention (without mandatory access being made available) of multiple lines for use in producing a variety; for the development of materials that would be made available under contract or sold to another entity, etc.

#### The List of Crops for the Multilateral System.

Annex I was the subject of passionate debate and substantial scientific input from experts (e.g., the results of technical workshops, the reports of groups of experts, etc.). Nevertheless, the text is less than clear in certain regards. “Wheat” is included in Annex I, but defined as “*Triticum*, et al.”. Et al.? In addition, the Treaty does not acknowledge the fact that taxonomists and breeders will disagree about what is included within a particular genus or even species. Moreover, such groupings change over time. Will the materials under the Multilateral System expand and contract as taxonomic understandings of what constitutes a particular genus, evolve? Assuming that the Governing Body will not want to undertake the cumbersome and costly task of constituting its own taxonomic authority, on what basis will Contracting Parties and centers decide whether questionable categories/materials are included or excluded? Practically speaking, how would the Treaty handle cases were materials considered today to be part of Annex I, fall off the list by virtue of changes in taxonomic practices?

#### Utilization for Production.

Article 12.3(a) states that access shall be provided “solely for the purpose of utilization and conservation for research, breeding and training for food and agriculture...” The current MTA used in the context of the agreements between FAO and the centers, allows for access for direct production. Plant breeders may acquire materials from the Multilateral System that they would want to release without any further research or breeding. Likewise, on occasion, farmers, NGOs or small companies may also wish to acquire a landrace and use it without further research or breeding. The Treaty does not appear to deal with this type of request. It is hoped that any doubt that might exist in the current text of the Treaty will be removed in the process of agreeing the various MTAs.

#### Disposition of Collections of non-Annex I Crops.

Under current agreements with FAO, centers are obliged to conserve and make available designated accessions. Under the new Treaty, materials of non-Annex I crops that have been collected prior to the entry into force of the Treaty and are held by the centers are to be made available under terms discussed above. No long-term or permanent obligation to maintain such collections is found in the Treaty. One can assume (given the criteria of importance to food security, and interdependence upon which Annex I was based, and in the absence of provisions to the contrary) that centers will have the authority to dispose of materials that are no longer of importance to their programmes. At present, centers are holding many accessions of minor species or wild plants that are unrelated to current needs / breeding programmes. In addition, they are holding “in trust” breeding lines and other materials that for a number of sound reasons might not warrant long term conservation. Centers, however, are unlike Contracting Parties in that they hold materials “in trust” for the international community. Nevertheless, CGIAR centers should, consistent with the rights that other institutions enjoy, have some discretion as to whether to maintain their commitment to conservation. Centers may want to develop guidelines addressing possible transfer of materials they no longer wish to keep to countries of origin or countries that supplied the materials, for instance. This approach could be addressed and agreed in the statement released at the time of concluding an agreement with the Governing Body.

### Return of PGRFA.

Article 15.1(b)(ii), which deals with non-Annex I PGRFA, allows for the provision of germplasm – without an MTA – to Contracting Parties in whose territory the PGRFA were collected from *in situ* conditions. The paragraph does not specify that PGRFA might also be provided to such non-Parties that contributed the material. Current agreements with FAO, do not, of course, make a distinction between Contracting Parties and non-Parties in this regard, and CGIAR centers in their new agreements with the Governing Body (or in a statement released concurrently) would probably want to clarify that such return of material, as a matter of principle, would be made without the use of an MTA to both Contracting Parties and non-Parties. (Return of Annex I materials is assured under the “facilitated access” provisions of the Multilateral System. Note, in addition, Article 12.3(g) which states that PGRFA accessed “shall continue to be made available to the Multilateral System by the recipients of those plant genetic resources for food and agriculture,” and Article 12.6, which specifically addresses access in emergency disaster situations for the purpose of contributing to the re-establishment of agricultural systems.)

### Non-Parties.

The Treaty regulates relations between Contracting Parties, and between Centers (that agree to be bound by provisions of the Treaty) and Contracting Parties. Like most treaties, it does not specify relations with non-Parties. The Treaty’s article on non-Parties (Article 31), as noted above, simply states that non-Parties are encouraged to accept the Treaty. The FAO Commission, through its agreement with CGIAR centers, has already confirmed the history of the CGIAR accessions, i.e., that they were “donated or collected on the understanding that these accessions will remain freely available and that they will be conserved and used in research on behalf of the international community, in particular the developing countries.” Given this understanding, we cannot logically interpret the Treaty as implying that access to non-Parties would be denied. It would be equally illogical, however, to argue that access to non-Parties would be without any terms or conditions. We may assume, therefore, that access to non-Parties – to all in the international community – should be provided assuming that the non-Party accepts the terms and conditions in the new MTA. If centers deem it necessary, this understanding could be included in the statement on implementation.

### Practical Matters Pertaining to Implementation.

In the context of the current agreements with FAO, the CGIAR centers had an *ad hoc* mechanism for addressing practical issues involving implementation, as they arose: FAO and the centers developed and issued joint interpretive statements on implementation. The second such statement, in particular, focused on a wide variety of issues, *inter alia*, what centers would do in cases where violations of the MTAs were alleged, the “right” of the centers to manage collections in a sound scientific manner, the right to deny unreasonable requests (for excessive numbers of accessions or quantity of seed), and the right to withhold any materials that were diseased. In the last two cases, FAO and the centers acknowledged that access does not equal availability. In some cases, seed will not be available, at least immediately. In agreements with

the Governing Body, or in similar interpretive statements, centers may wish to make reference to previous understandings about how they will manage collections and implement the Treaty.

In addition, the new agreements / and associated statements on implementation may need to address the following subjects:

- The need for regular consultations with FAO on the mechanics of operationalizing center implementation of the Treaty, and the likelihood that a mechanism such as joint statements may still be needed.
- Recognition that existing research contracts and agreements will be honored and will not be subject to certain aspects of the Treaty. This may apply when centers are engaged in joint research projects with other institutions under the framework of agreements that would specify an arrangement for access to and use of materials in a center genebank that would not necessarily include the terms of the new to-be-determined MTA.
- The non-differential treatment of non-Parties with regard to non-Annex I materials distributed by centers under the terms of the Treaty.
- Clarification of what is meant by the Article 12 phrase wherein access is facilitated for materials that are “under the management and control,” in this case – of a center. This would provide an opportunity to ensure that collections being held by centers for others under contract (i.e., for ‘black-box’ storage), would not be part of the collections being placed by centers into the Treaty system.
- Clarification that all CGIAR centers signing agreements with the Governing Body will have the automatic right to be present as observers in all meetings of the Governing Body and its subsidiary bodies.

### **Next Steps for Centers in Implementing the Treaty**

The FAO Conference, in adopting the Treaty passed a resolution that, *inter alia*, called on the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, acting as the interim Committee for the Treaty prior to its coming into force, to:

**“ consult with the International Agricultural Research Centres and other relevant international institutions on the agreements to be signed with the Governing Body, in accordance with Article 15 of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, and prepare draft agreements for the consideration of the Governing Body at its first session”**

Furthermore, the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, at its meeting in June 2001, passed a resolution that:

**“Requests the Director General of FAO and the Directors General of those International Agricultural Research Centres which have signed agreements with FAO to collaborate in the preparation of a revised Material Transfer Agreement that**

**will, as appropriate, take into account the provisions of the revised Undertaking and support an effective transition; and**

***Further requests that the draft Material Transfer Agreement be presented to the Ninth Regular Session of the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, for its consideration.”***

The MTA referred to, once approved by the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, is to be used by the Centres until:

- A standard Material Transfer Agreement has been approved by the Governing Body of the Treaty for use in the transfer of all materials included within the Multilateral System. In order to prepare this standard Material Transfer Agreement the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture has been requested to set up an Expert Group comprising technical and legal experts, that will make recommendations on the terms of the standard MTA to the first meeting of the Governing Body on the Treaty; and
- The terms of a second Material Transfer Agreement have been agreed by the Governing Body, in consultation with the Centres, for use in the transfer of Centre-held in-trust genetic resources that are not included in the Multilateral System. The Governing Body is to approve this second Material Transfer Agreement no later than at its second regular session.

In order to meet these requests by the Commission and the FAO Conference, the following timetable is envisaged, assuming all goes according to schedule and no step in the process is delayed for any reason:

**Timetable**

February 2002	The ICWG-GR/SGRP meeting in Rome and the SGRP/GRPC/CAS/ CGIAR System Office workshop held at IIRI considered both the elements for the new Governing Body / Center Agreements as well as the proposed interim MTA, and approved negotiating text for both items.
February until the 9 <sup>th</sup> regular session of the Commission on GRFA (tentatively Oct 2002):	a) Discussion and negotiation between the Centers and FAO on the form of the text of the Agreement and interim MTA to be submitted to the Commission serving as interim committee of the Treaty. b) Endorsement by Center Boards of the draft texts.
October 2002:	9 <sup>th</sup> regular session of the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. Consideration by the Commission of a draft interim MTA. Commission establishes an Expert Group to make recommendations concerning the MTA to be considered / adopted by the Governing Body for use by Parties and centers.  First meeting of the Commission acting as Interim Committee  Governments will consider a programme of work and budget, including for the preparation of the standard MTA, and consultation with, and preparation of the agreements with CGIAR centers for consideration at the first meeting of the Governing Body.
October 2002 to mid 2003	Final endorsement of the interim MTA by Center Boards (if needed) and adoption of the new interim MTA by all Centers

October 2002 until the first meeting of the Governing Body (2003/4?)	Centers to consult with FAO/the Interim Committee for the preparation of draft agreements between them and the Governing Body, and work with the Expert Group to help prepare the standard MTA for use with materials within the Multilateral System.
First meeting of the Governing Body (2003/4?)	a) Adoption of the text of the new agreements to be signed with the Centers b) Adoption of the standard MTA
Period following the first meeting of the Governing Body	a) Endorsement of the new agreements by Center Boards (if needed). b) Signing of the new agreements with the Governing Body/Treaty Secretariat c) Preparation of draft MTA to be used in the transfer of Center-held material that is not included within the Multilateral System
Second regular session of the Governing Body (approx. 2 years after the first regular session)	Adoption of the MTA to be used in the transfer of Center-held material that is not included within the Multilateral System.
Period after second regular session of the Governing Body	a) Endorsement of the new MTA by Center Boards (if needed). b) New MTA comes into use by all Center for materials not included in the Multilateral System