

## **Evolution of the CGIAR's Governance and Structure— A Personal Reflection<sup>1</sup>**

### **The Story Begins in 1990**

The story on the evolution of the CGIAR's governance and structure should perhaps start with the expansion of the CGIAR in 1990, from a 13-center system to an 18-center system. The System's governance was essentially unchanged from its founding in 1971 until the expansion. And, at the time of the expansion in 1990, no other structural option was considered, other than adding more centers.

The expansion was based on a study undertaken by TAC, at the request of the CGIAR, when the CGIAR agreed to broaden its mandate to cover research on natural resource management (NRM). After considering 10 research institutions or initiatives, TAC recommended inclusion of five, including forestry, agroforestry, fisheries, water management and research on bananas. Although TAC recommended to have only one CGIAR center covering forestry and agroforestry, the membership of the CGIAR insisted on having a separate center on forestry, in addition to bringing in an existing center dealing with agroforestry. Because the mindset of the CGIAR was so fixed on the "independent center model" for conducting research that it did not even consider having a single board managing two separate operations (in forestry and agroforestry). A token attempt was made, however, to secure some coordination between the two centers by having the chairs of each board serve as an ex-officio member of the other board (an arrangement that continues to this day.)

(See the CGIAR decision on this at the 1990 Annual Meeting; pp 5-6 of the following: <http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/csop1190.pdf>)

### **The 1992 Financial Crisis and CGIAR's Response**

Although the expansion was timely from a strategic viewpoint (it came just before the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 which elevated NRM issues to the forefront of the global agenda), it compounded the financial difficulties the CGIAR faced two years later. This was a problem of "making ends meet," when the Centers' program proposals for 1998 (endorsed by TAC) exceeded the resources available by some \$40-50 million (270m vs. 225m). To add to this, operating as an 18-center system introduced complexities that began to strain the CGIAR's discussion and decision processes.

Over the course of the next two years the CGIAR addressed these governance and financing issues by taking three actions:

1. For the first time in its history, the CGIAR formed two standing committees (an Oversight Committee and a Finance Committee) in 1993. This followed from the

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<sup>1</sup> This note was prepared by Selcuk Ozgediz at the request of the Working Group on Governance, 2008 CGIAR Change Management exercise, as background to the discussions of the Working Group.

recommendations of a CG Working Group on Deliberation and Decision Making, established in May 1992, headed by Bob Herdt.

(The report of the Herdt WG is an interesting document and highlights how the Group approached issues of governance reform in early 1990s.)  
(<http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/cg9305c.pdf>)

2. The Group identified two areas for potential streamlining: livestock research and research on bananas. In each case a CGIAR task force was formed to explore options and make a recommendation. This approach led to a CGIAR decision to merge ILCA and ILRAD (the two livestock centers) into a new center (ILRI) and to bring INIBAP (the research network that had just been included in the CGIAR during the expansion in 1990) under the administrative umbrella of IPGRI (now Bioversity). These actions helped reduce the number of centers from 18 to 16.

(The CGIAR decision on these can be found in the proceedings of the 1993 Mid-Term Meeting in Puerto Rico: <http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/csop0593.pdf>)

3. With continuing difficulties in funding and no remedy in sight for meeting the agreed program funding levels for 1998 (at \$270 m), the CGIAR asked TAC to develop a restructuring proposal to enable the CGIAR to operate at a lower funding level. This is the first time the CGIAR seriously considered restructuring the System.

(See the proceedings of the 1993 annual CGIAR meeting:  
<http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/csop1193.pdf>)

### **A New Chair and a New Approach**

When Ismail Serageldin took over the chairmanship of the CGIAR from V. Rajagopalan in 1994, he asked TAC to suspend the restructuring study (which had already been prepared in draft form but was being kept confidential) to enable him to explore the possibility of raising additional funds. As a result, the restructuring study never saw the light of day. Serageldin was able to secure once-only additional funds from the World Bank (matched by other donors) and prevented a major dissection of the System through a large scale restructuring.

The injection of additional resources brought new life to the CGIAR. When you add to this the actions in three other fronts, the System gained a new momentum:

1. A new vision statement was developed for the CGIAR articulated by a panel chaired by Gordon Conway (appointed by the newly formed Oversight Committee). Besides being a vision on the business side of the CGIAR, the vision study also articulated a long-term vision on the operation of the CGIAR, with implications on its future structure. These thoughts still have relevance today.

(See, in particular, pp 59-64):

([http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/lucdocs\\_ad\\_6677.pdf](http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/lucdocs_ad_6677.pdf))

2. The Oversight Committee prepared a paper entitled: “CGIAR’s Governance and Organization: Is There Need for Change,” providing several options ranging from full centralization towards full decentralization (free market model). The options mentioned here are also as valid today as they were in 1994. Although the Committee saw a centralized model as the long-term solution, there was no appetite for a major change at that time (and the new Chair did not favor it), the Committee opted to recommend “marginal adjustments” to governance and a larger follow-up study.

(See: <http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/cg9405d.pdf>)

3. The larger follow-up study was conducted by a panel Mr Serageldin appointed, headed by Klaus Winkel of Denmark (Study Panel on the CGIAR’s Long-Term Governance and Financing Structure). The Panel provided the seeds for establishing a Global Forum on International Agricultural Research (and associated regional forums), recommended a shift towards a programmatic approach (along the lines of the Conway Panel) and some streamlining of governance as requested by Serageldin. No answers were provided to the structure question, except viewing the centers as “franchised institutions” carrying out CGIAR-agreed programs. Establishment of the Consultative Group as an international organization was rejected (in favor of having it continue functioning as an informal body.)

(See the executive summary of: <http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/cg9410d.pdf>)

4. A ministerial-level meeting of the CGIAR held in Lucerne in 1995 integrated the above background studies and launched a *renewal program*. The Lucerne Declaration and Action Program outlines the main decisions made (see pp. 9-12 below).

(<http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/lucsop.pdf>)

### **The Third System Review**

Implementation of the decisions taken at the Lucerne meeting consumed the CGIAR’s attention over the next two years—especially the establishment of the Global Forum and the regional forums and the new partnership committees. The intellectual agenda was dominated by discussions of biotechnology and intellectual property issues. While change was taking place, there was also a growing demand to have an external review of the System, which had constantly been pushed forward for one reason and another since 1981. The decision to have a System Review was taken in 1996, but the review did not get going until 1998.

The System Review made 29 principal recommendations, of which more than half were on governance and finance. (See the summary and recommendations section of:

<http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/3SysRev.pdf>)

I will highlight three points about the System Review’s handling of governance and structure:

1. The review did not address structure at all! There is only one page on this (p. 60) in the report. While the panel was convinced that there was need for consolidation, it had no advice to give on how to go about it. Instead, it suggested that a separate management review should be conducted to address this issue.
2. The review endorsed three of the CGIAR's core governance principles (donor sovereignty, center autonomy and independent technical advice). It did not support consensus decision-making and continuing as an informal organization. It recommended, instead, to have the CGIAR incorporated as a public, non-profit organization with a Central Board and a full-time chair.
3. It is worth to emphasize that the Central Board recommendation of the System Review relates only to handling the affairs of the Consultative Group, i.e., it is not the same concept as having the centers organized under a single board.

The discussion of the System Review was the main agenda item at the 1998 Annual Meeting. While agreeing with the thrust of most recommendations, the CGIAR politely rejected the recommendation on the central board. The decision notes that the CGIAR “expressed reservations about the Panel's recommendations to establish the CGIAR as a legal entity, eliminate the co-sponsor status of the UN agencies that founded the CGIAR, appoint a full-time Chairman who also acts as Chief Executive Officer...”

The recommendation was rejected, in part, because the panel had not made a convincing case, with options and criteria, and partly because the Members were not ready to give up their “sovereignty.” There was also a great deal of uncertainty about legal obligations under such an arrangement and the additional complexities that would be created. (p 95 of the following annual meeting proceedings document lists the types of reasons given by the members for rejecting the recommendation.)

<http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/icw98sop.pdf>

### **Follow-up to the Third System Review**

The System Review did not generate change in the fundamental characteristics of the CGIAR. A cumbersome follow-up mechanism slowed implementation of the agreed recommendations. A year after the discussion of the review, the CGIAR agreed to take a fresh look at its vision and strategy, as well as its structure. TAC was asked to come with a proposal on vision and strategy and TAC and the centers were collectively asked to address the need for institutional changes.

TAC produced a vision statement, which introduced no change in “what” the CGIAR does, but highlighted some priority areas and suggested shifting towards different modes of operation. The CGIAR agreed more work was needed on vision as well as on structure. Meanwhile Serageldin retired and was replaced by Ian Johnson as Chair of CGIAR.

Part of the new vision exercise led by TAC involved an electronic conference of CGIAR stakeholders on governance and structure. Led by Julio Berdegue of Chile, this discussion yielded many thoughts and options on structure which are still relevant today. (See pp. 6-16 of the synthesis document below.)

([http://www.cgiar.org/changemanagement/pdf/wg1\\_Berdegue\\_structure\\_%20e-conference\\_2000.pdf](http://www.cgiar.org/changemanagement/pdf/wg1_Berdegue_structure_%20e-conference_2000.pdf))

While work on vision and strategy was going on, the centers were busy discussing among themselves some structural options for the future. The outcome was a proposal for forming a “federation of CGIAR centers.” The concept is not much different from that of the current Alliance of CGIAR Centers and would be interesting to review to understand how the concept has evolved.

(<http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/Federation.pdf>)

With several proposals on organization and structure on the table, the CGIAR asked the Oversight Committee Chair to convene a meeting of stakeholders to synthesize the options. The outcome of the “Synthesis Group” meeting in the fall of 2000 was to urge the CGIAR to go with “quick wins” in streamlining governance and organization and to begin studying longer-term structural questions, such as forming a federation.

(<http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/icw0007.pdf>)

The 2000 Annual Meeting considered the way forward on these issues. The federation proposal was not endorsed, because of the fears of some members in mixing investor responsibilities with center responsibilities and confounding accountabilities. After identifying a few quick win areas, the Chair recommended, and the CGIAR agreed with the establishment of a Change Design and Management Team (CDMT), working under a CGIAR Steering Group, to generate concrete proposals for improving the CGIAR’s governance, organization and structure.

(<http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/icw00sop.pdf>)

### **Change Design and Management and the Reform Program**

The full report of the CDMT makes a good read (not just because I was a member of the team that produced it!). Sections II and III contain useful arguments that are still relevant on the pros and cons of restructuring the System.

(<http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/mtm0105.pdf>)

The sequence of events following the System Review, including the reforms that followed the review, are well illustrated graphically in the following slide presentation made at the Alignment Forum in Madrid in May 2007:

([http://www.cgiar.org/externalreview/CGIAR\\_Reform\\_Program.pdf](http://www.cgiar.org/externalreview/CGIAR_Reform_Program.pdf))

This slide presentation and the Reifschneider, et. al. piece entitled “Revolutionizing the Evolution of the CGIAR: 2001-2007” provide a good summary of the main thrusts of the reforms initiated with the Change Design and Management effort.

([http://www.cgiar.org/pdf/af\\_cgiar\\_reform\\_050207.pdf](http://www.cgiar.org/pdf/af_cgiar_reform_050207.pdf))

Instead of going over the reforms that were initiated, I comment below on three questions that are related more directly with the governance and structure questions that are the subject of the current change effort.

1. *Why didn't the CDMT make specific recommendations on structure?* There were two reasons. First, the team did not have a strong argument in favor of one or another structural arrangement, especially if they involved mergers of centers. There was a preference for a “clustering” approach to structure, but no clear criteria for forming the clusters. This is a promising area to explore by the current change management initiative.

Second, the shift to the programmatic approach (i.e., Challenge Programs) recommended by the team was believed to induce structural change among the centers in the longer term.

2. *What worked and what did not work among the CDMT reforms?* The System governance reforms (such as having one AGM and establishing an Executive Council) seem to have taken hold. Similarly, after a slow start, the Challenge Programs have gained greater acceptance (and helped introduce some change in mindsets about a programmatic approach.) The other two reforms (Science Council and the System Office) did not have the anticipated effect—meaning that these two areas (science advice and corporate office for the CGIAR) require further exploration during the current change effort.

3. *How did the CGIAR allocate functional responsibilities to the governance units that emerged from the reform effort?* This is a question that was raised during the first meeting of WG3. I attach a matrix (and the accompanying text) that illustrate how the reform implementation group saw the allocation of functional responsibilities to governance units.

### **The OED Meta Evaluation, ISNAR, and the Sub-Saharan Africa Task Force**

The Meta Evaluation was commissioned by the World Bank and was intended to examine how well the CGIAR had responded to the recommendations of the Third System Review. The 2003 review went beyond its narrow TOR and conducted, in effect, something akin to another system review. Its recommendations covered, among others, several aspects of governance and organization. In particular, the evaluation questioned the continuing appropriateness of CGIAR's governance principles. See, in particular, the last page of the following is a short summary of the evaluation:

[http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/D01D16C0D67B0F3085256D56005AE040/\\$file/Precis\\_232\\_CGIAR.pdf](http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/D01D16C0D67B0F3085256D56005AE040/$file/Precis_232_CGIAR.pdf)

During this period, ISNAR, one of the 16 centers under the CGIAR umbrella, underwent a regular External Program and Management Review (EPMR), which found ISNAR's performance and impact to be lacking. In the usual CGIAR fashion a Task Force (TF) was formed to recommend a solution, and the TF recommended closing the center, with

its key functions transferred to IFPRI. Because it has no direct authority over ISNAR, the CGIAR “requested” the Board of ISNAR to dissolve the Center—which the Board accepted and implemented. This is a recent case that illustrates how the “power of the purse” can generate action in the System when there is a will (=consensus.)<sup>2</sup>

The discussions on ISNAR involved devolution of some ISNAR activities to IFPRI, to be managed in Africa. At the same time, the CGIAR was discussing ICRISAT’s activities in Africa. Piecemeal discussions of center activities taking place in Africa, naturally, prompted questioning how these activities were going to be aligned. In the usual CGIAR fashion, a TF was formed to examine programmatic and structural alignment of CGIAR activities in SSA (as a first step towards examining alignment across all regions) The TF observed that there is no “system vision” for CGIAR in SSA and recommended that, in the long-term, the CGIAR should be governed by a single “corporate” board, with the centers as subsidiaries. As a step in that direction, for SSA the TF recommended forming two entities, one serving East and Southern Africa and the other West and Central Africa. (See the Summary and Recommendations section of the report below.) ([http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/agm05\\_ssa\\_tf\\_report\\_.pdf](http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/agm05_ssa_tf_report_.pdf))

The CGIAR’s follow-up of the SSA TF report is quite interesting and illustrates the difficulty of initiating structural change. The central recommendation on a single “corporate” board was left aside, in favor of examining what alignment was possible in the SSA region. Forming two CGIAR entities in SSA, one in the East and the other in the West, was diluted to improving alignment among the centers in (1) programs, (2) governance, (3) corporate services. In West Africa, for example, the key centers (IITA and WARDA) were asked to work towards common board membership (which, under normal turnover conditions, would take years) as a first step towards aligning governance. It appears that neither the centers concerned, nor the involved Members were fully behind the recommendations of the TF, but were nevertheless willing to go along with the idea of working towards greater alignment where possible, without giving up individual center autonomy.

### **Center Governance**

I have had the opportunity to work with (and observe from a distance) the evolution of the Center Boards over the last 25 years. My overall conclusion is that the performance of the Boards have improved significantly over this period. The most dramatic change has been in the role of the Boards, from one that acted more as an advisor to the DG to one that fully recognizes its fiduciary and oversight responsibilities.

Nevertheless, the glass is still half-full. Board failures are not uncommon (e.g., the recent CIAT case). At the same time serious board reform is taking place across the System (e.g., CIMMYT, which undertook a reform following a governance crisis, and a few

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<sup>2</sup> FYI, in 2006 a colleague and I wrote a case study of ISNAR, covering the turn of events from its inception to its closure, and pointing to failures in governance and management at various points. I can forward the case study to those interested.

others<sup>3</sup>). The challenge for the boards remains to be: (1) identifying competent people who have (2) the information and (3) the time to address (4) key strategic issues faced by the center.

The 2006 Stripe Review of Center Governance provides a good overview of corporate governance at the center-level across the System. The Panel's 31 recommendations were discussed by the Centers and action was taken on most of them. The Executive Summary of the review would be a good place to start to find out more about center governance. ([http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/Stripe\\_review\\_report\\_2006.pdf](http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/Stripe_review_report_2006.pdf))

Another useful source is the External Program and Management Review of each center. The latest EPMP of each center can be accessed through the "Resources" section of the Change Management web site. Each EPMP has a section of governance, where the Panel expresses judgment on the effectiveness of that center's board.

Finally, the CGIAR's 2007 Guidelines on Center Governance ("Roles, Responsibilities and Accountability of Center Boards") outlines what the CGIAR expects from center boards. I had the unique opportunity to put these together last year, with advice from two external governance experts. They were reviewed by the Alliance Board (made up of the chairs of the 15 centers) and endorsed by the CGIAR membership (meaning that they constitute CGIAR policy.) I suggest that WG3 colleagues review at least the sections on "Principles of Corporate Governance in the CGIAR" and "Basic Responsibilities of the Board."

([http://www.cgiar.org/pdf/bg\\_guidelines\\_center\\_governance\\_rra\\_200711.pdf](http://www.cgiar.org/pdf/bg_guidelines_center_governance_rra_200711.pdf))

A companion volume entitled "CGIAR Guidelines on Center Governance: Reference Materials" may be of interest to those who wish to examine tools for board operations (such as instruments for assessing the Director General's performance.)

([http://www.cgiar.org/pdf/bg\\_referencematerials\\_200711.pdf](http://www.cgiar.org/pdf/bg_referencematerials_200711.pdf))

### **Governance of Challenge Programs**

This is the last topic covered in this note (☺). The issue here is that there are as many different governance arrangements as there are challenge programs. This is mainly because CPs are not legally constituted entities. As programs of the CGIAR, their steering committees technically "report" to the Executive Council of the CGIAR, itself an informal group.

A 2004 study conducted by the Science Council and the CGIAR Secretariat on pilot CPs provides some light on the issues of governance. (See pp 12-14 in the following)

([http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/agm04\\_cp\\_lessons.pdf](http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/agm04_cp_lessons.pdf))

The external reviews of three CPs conducted in 2006 and 2007 (available through the Change Management site) also comment on the effectiveness of the governance arrangements for each CP.

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<sup>3</sup> The Secretariat also has a case study of governance at CIMMYT, similar to the ISNAR case study.

## **Attachment**

*Note: The following is an excerpt from the Interim Executive Council Recommendations on CGIAR Reform: An Integrated Proposal (2002)*

### **Functions of the CGIAR Executive Council (ExCo)**

The ExCo is a committee of stakeholders, incorporating perspectives from all components of the CGIAR System, appointed by the CGIAR (the Group) to facilitate decision-making, carry out certain delegated functions and follow-up actions arising out of annual general meetings (AGMs) of the Group. The ExCo will have authority to act on behalf of the Group between AGMs on matters delegated to it by the Group. The CGIAR will delegate to the ExCo the functions necessary for carrying out the regular business of the Group, recognizing the need to align the functions of all CGIAR governance units. In addition, the ExCo will facilitate decision-making by the Group and provide oversight during implementation of the Group's decisions.

The ExCo would meet at least twice a year to transact business. Each ExCo meeting will be co-chaired by the CGIAR Chairman and an ExCo member selected by the ExCo to serve as Co-Chair for the duration of that meeting. The CGIAR Director would serve as the Executive Secretary of the ExCo and the ExCo may authorize the CGIAR Director to take follow-up actions between meetings. Support services would be provided by the System Office.

The ExCo would hold short meetings (e.g. two days) and conduct them in a businesslike fashion. The ExCo should report to the Group regularly, using electronic and other means

The Executive Council will be responsible for the following functions:

#### *Goal setting and planning:*

- coordination and oversight of the CGIAR-wide strategic and operational planning processes as directed by the Group;
- recommendations to the Group on the System's strategic and operational plans and the selection of Challenge Programs drawing on inputs and advice from the Science Council and other stakeholders; deciding on planning grants to assist in the preparation of CPs;
- recommendations to the Group concerning policies and decisions on resource mobilization and allocation plans;
- recommendations to the Group on medium term plans and annual financing plans for the System and its advisory and support units;
- requests to the Science Council for scientific advice on programmatic and other Systemwide strategic issues.

#### *Monitoring implementation:*

- monitoring administrative actions arising out of the decisions of the Group, including those pertaining to resource mobilization and allocation;

- monitoring the progress, quality and effectiveness of Challenge Programs with advice from the SC for reporting to the Group.

*Evaluation:*

- oversight of evaluation activities on behalf of the Group, with support from the Science Council and the Secretariats;
- recommendations to the Group on actions to be taken in the light of evaluations of the performance and impact of the Centers and Challenge Programs.

*Self Governance:*

- recommendation to the Group concerning key appointments to Systemwide posts (e.g., Science Council and SPIA Chairs and members, CGIAR-nominees on Center boards);
- oversight of the work programs and performance of advisory and support units;
- advice and counsel to The Group on all other matters of Systemwide governance.

The process steps and products shown in the matrix below largely follow the present CGIAR processes (which are described in Box 1 on page 31 of the 2000 CGIAR Annual Report) and suggest how responsibilities should be shared among the various elements of System governance in the future. Detailed definitions follow the matrix.

**Matrix of Responsibilities**

<b>Product</b>	<b>Timing</b>	<b>Stakeholder</b>	<b>CGIAR</b>	<b>Executive Council</b>	<b>Science Council 1/</b>	<b>System Office</b>	<b>Centers and Challenge Programs</b>
<b>Planning Context</b>	5 Years	Collaborate	Approval	Oversight	Prepare	Facilitate	Collaborate
<b>Planning Guidance</b>	3 – 5 years	Collaborate	Approval	Oversight	Collaborate	Prepare	Collaborate
<b>Medium Term Plans</b>	Rolling						
<b>i] Periodic</b>	3years	Collaborate	Approval	Oversight		Consolidate	Prepare
<b>ii] Project Portfolio</b>	as required	Collaborate		Approval	Review of Science	Consolidate	Prepare
<b>Annual Operating Plan</b>						Consolidate	Prepare and Approve
<b>Annual Financing Plans</b>	October		Approval	Oversight		Consolidate	Prepare
<b>Evaluation &amp; Impact Assessment</b>	Periodic	Collaborate	Decision	Oversight, follow-up	Commission (programmatic)	Commission (management)	Collaborate
<b>Annual Ex-post Report</b>	April			Oversight		Consolidate	Prepare

1/ A Working Group to be established by the ExCo in 2002 will prepare a detailed proposal on the SC's responsibilities and functions.

Definitions:

Planning Context: Periodically assessing the needs of CGIAR client group for services from the CGIAR in context of emerging developments in science, trends in global economy and the economies of developing countries, and availability of capacity in CGIAR partners and stakeholders. This would serve to update the CGIAR's vision, strategy and priorities, and as a basis for resource allocation across the System.

CGIAR Planning Guidance: Based on the context, planning guidelines describe objectives and proposed deliverables for the CGIAR, areas and activities of more and less emphasis, changes in modes of operation and provide a broad assessment of required human and financial resources. The document provides planning guidance to centers in preparing their medium term plans.

CGIAR Medium-Term Plans (periodic): Based on the guidance provided by the CGIAR and their own strategic plans, centers (and challenge programs as appropriate) prepare program and business plans on a rolling three-year basis. The CGIAR medium term plan is an aggregation of center medium term plans.

CGIAR Project Portfolio: A basic program-planning unit in center plans is a logical framework based portfolio of projects. The projects describe specific objectives, identify collaborators and partners, define deliverables and provide required budgets. The CGIAR Project Portfolio is a consolidated portfolio of center and CP project portfolios.

CGIAR Annual Operating Plan: Centers prepare more detailed operating plans annually to develop work programs, plan activities and resource outlays. The plans identify deliverables for the year. These are reviewed and approved by the Boards of centers or the governing bodies of CPs. The CGIAR annual plan is an aggregation of center operating plans.

CGIAR Annual Financing Plan: Financing plans identify sources of financing for the operating plans and, in case of a mismatch between budgets and availability of financing, revise the deliverables. The CGIAR financing plan is an aggregation of Center and CP financing plans, which are reviewed and approved by their respective governing bodies..

Evaluations and Impact Assessments: Periodic reviews of program performance (Centers, Systemwide, and Challenge Programs), as well as assessments of the impacts of these programs on CGIAR goals provide verifiable information which is fed back into future planning guidance.

CGIAR Annual ex-post Report: At the end of the year, Centers prepare an assessment of planned vs. actual deliverables. The CGIAR Annual Report will include an aggregation of Center reports.